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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,1 the United 
States Supreme Court differentiated between compensatory and punitive 
damages, stating, “compensatory damages and punitive damages . . . 
serve distinct purposes.  The former are intended to redress the concrete 
loss that the plaintiff has suffered . . . . The latter . . . operate as ‘private 
fines’ intended to punish the defendant and to deter future 
wrongdoing.”2  This Note discusses the United States Supreme Court’s 
evolving view of punitive damages, focusing on the recent case of Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker,3 in which the Supreme Court held that a one-to-
one ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages was an appropriate 
“upper limit” in maritime cases.4   
This Note will touch upon the numerous constitutional challenges 
the doctrine of punitive damages has faced, and will discuss noteworthy 
Supreme Court cases preceding Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker at length, 
including BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,5 as well as State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.6  This Note argues 
against the imposition of a strict one-to-one maximum ratio of punitive-
to-compensatory damages.  In light of the varying application of Exxon 
outside of the maritime context, such an imposition defeats the purpose 
of punitive damages by diluting their potential for deterrence, and it 
needlessly complicates the punitive-damages analysis.   
 
 1. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
 2. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2633 n.27 (2008) (citing Cooper 
Industries, 532 U.S. at 432). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 2633.  See infra Part III.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker).  While the Supreme Court did expressly limit its holding to cases arising 
under maritime law, many lower courts have been going through an Exxon analysis in reviewing 
punitive damage awards in non-maritime cases.  See, e.g., infra note 251. 
 5. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 6. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
2
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Instead of relying on the strict one-to-one ratio imposed in Exxon, a 
maritime case that was decided under federal common law,7 this Note 
argues in favor of the State Farm single-digit maximum-multiple due 
process approach.8 This approach provides greater flexibility and 
discretion to lower courts while also upholding the traditional goals of 
punitive damages: namely those of deterrence, revenge, and 
punishment.9  Additionally, while it may be difficult to predict what 
long-term impact the Exxon decision may have,10 state and federal courts 
should be extremely cautious to apply this holding outside of the 
maritime context,11 and never in cases involving conduct more culpable 
than recklessness.12   
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Traditional Purposes of Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages or “exemplary damages” have existed in some 
form for over two hundred years.13 Juries have traditionally awarded 
 
 7. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2626-27 (“Our review of punitive damages today, then, 
considers not their intersection with the Constitution, but the desirability of regulating them as a 
common law remedy for which responsibility lies with this Court as a source of judge-made law in 
the absence of statute.”).  See infra Part II.E (discussing the maritime context in which the Exxon 
case arose, as well as the federal common law). 
 8. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2634 (“[A] single digit maximum is appropriate in all 
but the most exceptional of cases.”). 
 9. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 521-22 (1957). 
 10. In a case decided shortly after Exxon Shipping, the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania wrote: “[a]lthough Exxon is a maritime law case, it is clear that the 
Supreme Court intends that its holding have a much broader application.” Hayduk v. City of 
Johnstown, 580 F.Supp.2d 429, 484 n.46 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (emphasis added). 
 11. This argument is supported by Justice Stevens’ dissent in Exxon Shipping, in which he 
argued that punitive damages in the maritime context may serve to compensate plaintiffs for 
“intangible injuries” that would have been compensable under “general tort law.” Exxon Shipping 
Co.,128 S.Ct. at 2637 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra note 240 (citing the Exxon Shipping decision and describing the different 
degrees of culpable conduct).  Based on the reasoning of the Exxon decision, one could also argue 
that this ratio should be limited to cases where the plaintiff suffered a purely economic injury; the 
Exxon Court supported its ultimate holding by turning to the fact that “the compensatory remedy 
sought in [Exxon] is itself entirely a judicial creation,” as pure economic injuries were not 
compensable at common law.  Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2630.  One writer has noted that 
“the Court should have enacted a higher ratio or allowed for minimal flexibility in its standard to 
leave room to address the issues of undercompensation and maliciousness or greed.”  Note, Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker:  The Supreme Court Tightens the Purse Strings on Corporate Punitive 
Awards, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 141 (2008). 
 13. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at  2620.  The Court stated that punitive damages “date 
back at least to 1763,” and noted that similar concepts appeared in “legal codes from ancient times 
through the Middle Ages.”  Id. 
3
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them in cases where the defendant acted recklessly, maliciously, or 
“from an evil state of mind.”14  As the United States Supreme Court 
wrote in 1851: 
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions of 
trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are 
called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, 
having in view the enormity of his offence [sic] rather than the 
measure of compensation to the plaintiff.15 
The historical purposes for awarding punitive damages were to 
punish a defendant for his wrongful actions, to exact revenge from the 
wrongdoing defendant, and to deter the defendant (and others) from 
acting wrongfully in the future.16  The doctrine of punitive damages has 
roots in both federal and state law, and most states authorize imposing 
punitive damages for certain types of wrongful conduct.17  Furthermore, 
many jurisdictions have held that juries may award punitive damages 
against employers as a result of vicarious liability, reasoning that 
 
 14. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 517.  Punitive damages 
are often uninsurable, as “[i]t would seem that insurance against exemplary damages frustrates their 
purposes and should be considered contrary to public policy.  It is doubtful whether a reckless or 
malicious defendant will be deterred if he knows that his liability insurer will pay all the damages 
levied against him.”  Id. at 527. 
 15. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).  “By the common as well as by statute law, 
men are often punished for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by means of a civil action, and 
the damages, inflicted by way of penalty or punishment, given to the party injured.”  Id. “The 
prevailing American rule limits punitive damages to cases of ‘enormity.’”  Exxon Shipping Co., 128 
S.Ct. at 2609 (citing Day, 54 U.S. at 371). 
 16. Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 521-22.  The author also noted 
that some jurisdictions recognize “compensation” as a reason for imposing punitive damages.  Id.  
The “compensation” goal was expressly rejected by the Exxon Court, which stated: “this Court has 
long held that ‘[p]unitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, 
but rather to punish the tortfeasor . . . and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct.’”  
Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2633 n.27 (citing Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 
266-67 (1981)). 
 17. Steven L. Chanenson & John Y. Gotanda, The Foggy Road for Evaluating Punitive 
Damages: Lifting the Haze from the BMW/State Farm Guideposts, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 441, 
447 (2004) (“Punitive damages have been permitted in actions involving torts, contracts, property, 
admiralty, employment, and family law.  On the federal level, a number of statutes authorize the 
award of punitive relief for specific violations.”).  Statutes allow treble damages in antitrust, patent 
and RICO cases.  See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2632 n.25 (2008); see also 
Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing Punishment, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 41 
(2009).  Mr. Fisher, a law professor at Stanford, argued the Exxon case before the Supreme Court.  
His oral argument is quoted multiple times throughout this Note. 
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“vicarious liability serves the public interest by inducing employers to 
use greater care in the selection and supervision of employees.”18    
B.  Precursors to the Imposition of a Ratio and Constitutional Concerns 
Over the past several decades, countless defendants have 
challenged the doctrine of punitive damages on various constitutional 
grounds.19  In 1991, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,20 the 
Court upheld a punitive damages award, but decided that “an award of 
more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be 
close to the line of constitutional impropriety.”21  The Haslip Court 
reasoned that at common law, juries determined the amount of punitive 
damages awards based on the seriousness of the wrongful act and the 
 
 18. Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 526 (citing Goddard v. Grand 
Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 1869 WL 2230 (1869)).  However, the Court employed different reasoning 
in The Amiable Nancy, and held that the owner of a ship was not liable for punitive damages as a 
result of the wrongful acts of its crew.  16 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1818).  The Court reasoned that the 
owners would rarely be able to completely indemnify themselves against the wrongful acts of their 
agents and that it was contrary to public policy to hold them liable for “vindictive damages.” Id.  In 
Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railroad, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine also took policy 
considerations into account, but came to the opposite conclusion.  1869 WL 2230 at 15.  The 
Goddard Court reasoned: 
If those who are in the habit of thinking that it is a terrible hardship to punish an innocent 
corporation for the wickedness of its agents and servants, will for a moment reflect upon 
the absurdity of their own thoughts, their anxiety will be cured. Careful engineers can be 
selected who will not run their trains into open draws; and careful baggage men can be 
secured, who will not handle and smash trunks and band-boxes as is now the universal 
custom; and conductors and brakemen can be had who will not assault and insult 
passengers; and if the courts will only let the verdicts of upright and intelligent juries 
alone, and let the doctrine of exemplary damages have its legitimate influence, we 
predict these great and growing evils will be very much lessened, if not entirely cured. 
Id. at 15. 
 19. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412 (2003); TXO 
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp. 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993) (invoking the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 
257, 260 (1989) (claiming that an award of punitive damages violates the Excessive Fines Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment).  See also Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive 
Damages are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 2 (2004) (arguing that punitive damages are 
unconstitutional because “purely public power to punish is being exercised by purely private actors 
who are naturally . . . focused not necessarily on furthering the public interest but rather . . . on 
pursuit of their own narrow interests.”). 
 20. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 21. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24).  Haslip involved a fraud 
action against Pacific Mutual and its agent, Lemmie Ruffin.  499 U.S. at 4-6.  Plaintiffs claimed that 
Ruffin collected their premiums, but did not give the money to the insurance company.  Id. at 6.  As 
a result, the policies lapsed.  Id. 
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need to deter others from acting similarly.22  After the jury enters a 
punitive damage award, the trial court and appellate courts review the 
award in order to ensure that it is “reasonable.”23  The Haslip Court went 
on to reason that every court that has considered this issue has held that 
the common law method does not violate due process and is 
constitutional.24  
In 1993, in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,25 
the Supreme Court upheld an award of $10 million in punitive damages, 
despite the fact that plaintiff was only awarded $19,000 in compensatory 
damages.26  The Court cited Haslip, and noted that the jury could 
consider the “financial position” of the defendant as one factor in 
awarding punitive damages.27  The Court reasoned that “[w]hile 
petitioner stresses the shocking disparity between the punitive award and 
the compensatory award, that shock dissipates when one considers the 
potential loss to respondents.”28  In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy 
asserted that: 
The Constitution identifies no particular multiple of compensatory 
damages as an acceptable limit for punitive awards; it does not concern 
itself with dollar amounts, ratios, or the quirks of juries in specific 
jurisdictions. Rather, its fundamental guarantee is that the individual 
citizen may rest secure against arbitrary or irrational deprivations of 
property.29 
Another constitutional challenge arose in the 1994 case of Honda 
Motor Co. v. Oberg.30  In that case, the plaintiff brought an action to 
 
 22. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15. 
 23. Id.  The Court reasoned that “[t]his Court more than once has approved the common-law 
method for assessing punitive damages.”  Id. 
 24. Id. at 17.  Despite this, the Court noted its “concern about punitive damages that ‘run 
wild.’”  Id. at 18. 
 25. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).  TXO Production Corp. was a slander of title suit that involved oil 
and gas development rights.  Id. at 446-47. 
 26. Id. at 446, 465.  The holding in TXO Production Corp. represented a punitive to 
compensatory damages ratio of 526-to-one.  Id. at 453. 
 27. Id. at 464. 
 28. Id. at 462.  The Court thus considered the amount of damages plaintiff would have 
suffered “in terms of reduced or eliminated royalties payments, had petitioner succeeded in its illicit 
scheme.”  Id. 
 29. Id. at 467 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  “The Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or 
arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.” State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell 538 U.S. at 409 
(citing Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001); BMW of N. 
Am., Inc v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996)). 
 30. 512 U.S. 415 (1994). 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss1/6
FINAL KLUTINOTY_MACRO.DOC 1/25/2010  2:53 PM 
2010] EXXON SHIPPING CO. V. BAKER 209 
recover damages for serious injuries caused when his Honda all-terrain 
vehicle overturned.31  The jury awarded the plaintiff $919,390.39 in 
compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages.32  On 
appeal, the Court once again relied on its decision in Haslip.33  Unlike in 
Haslip, here the Oregon courts were powerless to review the punitive 
damage award and correct the disparity.34  The Court reiterated its 
previous holdings that due process places limits on punitive damages, 
and held that the Oregon constitutional amendment prohibiting judicial 
review of juries’ punitive damage awards violated the United States 
Constitution.35   
In reaching this decision, the Oberg Court reasoned that it should 
uphold judicial review of the size of punitive awards, which has proven 
to be “a safeguard against excessive verdicts for as long as punitive 
damages have been awarded.”36  The Court did not rule on whether the 
punitive damage award was excessive, but instead decided that judicial 
review must be possible in order for a punitive damage award to be 
constitutional.37 
C.  BMW and State Farm: Setting the Stage for Exxon’s One-to-one ratio 
1.  BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore38 
In the past, courts tended to hold that there should be a “reasonable 
relationship”39 between compensatory and punitive damage awards, but 
 
 31. Id. at 418. 
 32. Id.  The Court reduced the plaintiff’s compensatory damages by 20 percent, as the 
plaintiff’s own negligence had contributed to his accident.  Id. 
 33. Id.  As the Haslip Court wrote: “[A]ppellate review makes certain that the punitive 
damages are reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has 
occurred and to deter its repetition.” Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 
(1991). 
 34. Honda  Motor Co., 512 U.S. at 418. 
 35. Id. at 418, 420.  The Court went on to say:  
There is a dramatic difference between the judicial review of punitive damages awards 
under the common law and the scope of review available in Oregon. An Oregon trial 
judge, or an Oregon appellate court, may order a new trial if the jury was not properly 
instructed, if error occurred during the trial, or if there is no evidence to support any 
punitive damages at all. But if the defendant’s only basis for relief is the amount of 
punitive damages the jury awarded, Oregon provides no procedure for reducing or 
setting aside that award. 
Id. at 426-27. 
 36. Id. at 421. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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they tended to reject the imposition of a “fixed mathematical ratio.”40  
However, after the United States Supreme Court decided BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore41 in 1996, the idea of using a ratio to determine the 
proper amount of punitive damages gained favor.42  
In BMW, the plaintiff, Gore, filed suit after learning that his “new” 
BMW was actually a damaged vehicle that BMW had repainted and sold 
to him as new without his knowledge or consent.43  At trial, BMW 
revealed that it had a policy of repairing damaged cars so long as the 
cost of repairs was three percent or less of the suggested retail price of 
the vehicle.44  After repairing the cars, BMW would then sell them as 
new without disclosing the repairs to the dealer or to the eventual 
buyer.45  At the conclusion of the trial, Gore received an award of $4,000 
in compensatory damages, and $4 million in punitive damages.46  BMW 
appealed the massive punitive award, and the Alabama Supreme Court 
reduced it to $2 million after they found the jury verdict “tainted.”47   
Despite this reduction, the United States Supreme Court still found 
the punitive damage award to be “grossly excessive” in violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as BMW did not 
have “fair notice” that such a severe penalty could be imposed against 
them.48  In so holding, the Court discussed “three guideposts, each of 
 
 39. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996) (“The principle that exemplary 
damages must bear a ‘reasonable relationship’ to compensatory damages has a long pedigree.”). 
 40. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 530 (citing Bell v. 
Preferred Life Assurance Soc’y, 320 U.S. 238 (1943) and Finney v. Lockhart, 217 P.2d 19 (Cal. 
1950)). 
 41. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 42. Andrew C. Lund, The Road from Nowhere? Punitive Damages Ratios After BMW v. Gore 
and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 20 TOURO L. REV. 943, 943-46 
(2005) (“BMW announced that ratio was to play a role in determining excessiveness.”).  Mr. Lund, a 
current member of the Pace Law School faculty, also noted that “much of the academic debate 
surrounding punitive damages, both before and after BMW, concerned such ratios.”  Id. at 944. 
 43. BMW, 517 U.S. at 563-65. 
 44. Id. at 563. 
 45. Id. at 564. 
 46. Id. at 565. 
 47. Id. at 567 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So.2d 619, 627 (Ala. 1994), rev’d, 
517 U.S. 559 (1996)).  “The Court found that the jury improperly computed the amount of punitive 
damages by multiplying Dr. Gore’s compensatory damages by the number of similar sales in other 
jurisdictions.”  Id. 
 48. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution states: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  The concept of “‘fair notice’ 
does not require mathematical certainty or anything close to it.”  Lund, supra note 42, at 945.  The 
BMW ruling was “the first time, the Supreme Court invalidated a state court award of punitive 
8
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which indicates that BMW did not receive adequate notice of the 
magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might impose . . . .”49   
 
The three guideposts set forth by the Court in BMW50 are: (1) “the 
degree of reprehensibility;” (2) “the disparity between the harm or 
potential harm . . . and [the] punitive damages award;”51 and (3) “the 
differences between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or 
imposed in comparable cases.”52  The court analyzed these three factors 
and held that the misconduct at issue was not sufficiently reprehensible 
to account for the $2 million punitive damage award, which represented 
a 500-to-one ratio of compensatory-to-punitive damages.53   
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in BMW, “lower courts’ 
reviews of punitive damage awards have officially included a review of 
the ratio between the punitive award and the underlying compensatory 
award.”54  However, in the aftermath of BMW, courts consistently de-
emphasized the ratio guidepost, and “the majority of post-BMW cases 
exemplified a trend among many courts to accord little or no weight to 
ratio.”55  The fact that it was impossible for post-BMW courts to 
 
damages on the ground that the amount violated the Due Process Clause.” Chanenson & Gotanda, 
supra note 17, at 442. 
 49. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574. 
 50. Id. at 575. 
 51. Id.  This guidepost is “the ratio of the punitive award to the compensatory award.”  Lund, 
supra note 42, at 950 (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 580-81). 
 52. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.  In discussing these guideposts, the Court gave much weight to the 
degree of reprehensibility, calling it “the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a 
punitive damage award.”  Id.  The Court asserted “[t]hat conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to 
give rise to tort liability, and even a modest award of exemplary damages does not establish the high 
degree of culpability that warrants a substantial punitive damages award.” Id. at 580. 
 53. Id. at 580, 583.  With regards to the third guidepost, the Court found that the $2 million 
punitive damages award against BMW was much greater than the amount BMW would be been 
fined under Alabama law, which would only have been $2,000.  Id. at 584. 
 54. Lund, supra note 42, at 943.  See also E.E.O.C. v. Federal Express Corp., 513 F.3d 360, 
377-78 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding a punitive damage award where the ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages was 12.5:1) and CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Services, 
499 F.3d 184, 193 (3rd Cir. 2007) (reducing a punitive damage award where the ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages was 18:1).  This is somewhat ironic, since the BMW Court explicitly stated: 
“[w]e need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally 
unacceptable that would fit every case.  We can say, however, that [a] general concer[n] of 
reasonableness  . . . properly enter[s] into the constitutional calculus.” 517 U.S. at 582-83 (quoting 
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993)). 
 55. Lund, supra note 42, at 957. See, e.g., Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320 
(11th Cir. 1999) (upholding a punitive damage award of $4.5 million where compensatory damages 
were only $47,000, a ratio of nearly 100-to-1) and Rahn v. Junction City Foundry, Inc., 161 F. 
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determine exactly what ratio would be permissible may partially explain 
their disregard of this guidepost.56 
2.  State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell 
By 2003, BMW’s “ratio guidepost had been rendered utterly 
impotent by the fact that no bright line existed.”57  Thus, when the 
United States Supreme Court decided State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell,58 it had an opportunity to create a “bright 
line rule,” and reinforce the importance of the ratio guidepost.59  The 
issue in State Farm was whether a punitive damage award of $145 
million could stand in light of a compensatory damage award of $1 
million.60  The case arose out of an automobile accident and ripened into 
a bad faith action when State Farm refused to pay a judgment entered 
against their insureds, Mr. and Mrs. Campbell.61   
Although witnesses and investigators asserted that Mr. Campbell’s 
negligence caused the automobile accident, State Farm contested 
liability, disregarded its own investigator’s recommendations, and 
decided not to settle the case for the settlement demand of the $50,000 
policy limit.62  The case went to trial and plaintiffs received a verdict of 
$185,849 against the Campbells as a result of Mr. Campbell’s 
 
Supp. 2d 1219, 1245 (D. Kan 2001) (upholding a $30,000 punitive damage award where the ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages was 30:1). 
 56. Lund, supra note 42, at 960 (“The impossibility of mathematical certainty with respect to 
what was a permissible or impermissible ratio also drove courts to simply disregard ratios 
entirely.”). 
 57. Id. at 962.  “Whether it was because other considerations were more important or because 
there was simply no workable way of applying the ratio guidepost, a third of BMW’s analysis was 
often being disregarded.” Id. at 964. 
 58. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 59. See Lund, supra note 42, at 977 (“[T]he ground was fertile for a substantial restatement of 
the Court’s punitive damages doctrine.”). 
 60. 538 U.S. at 412. 
 61. Id. at 412-13.  In 1981, Mr. and Mrs. Campbell were traveling in Utah when Mr. 
Campbell attempted to pass six vans that were ahead of him on the two lane highway.  Id. at 412.  
At that same time, Todd Ospital was traveling in the opposite direction down the same road and was 
forced to swerve and hit Robert Slusher’s vehicle in order to avoid a head on collision with the 
Campbell vehicle.  Id. at 412-13.  The accident killed Ospital, and Slusher became permanently 
disabled.  Id. at 413. 
 62. Id. at 413.  The injured parties filed wrongful death and tort actions, but Mr. Campbell 
maintained he was not at fault, even though witnesses and investigators asserted that he was 
negligent.  Id.  (citing Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2001), 
rev’d, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)). 
10
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negligence.63  Despite State Farm’s unwillingness to help the Campbells 
pursue an appeal, the Campbells retained personal counsel and 
proceeded to appeal the excess judgment on their own.64 
While the appeal was pending, the Campbells reached an 
agreement with Ospital’s estate and Slusher in which the Campbells 
agreed to initiate a bad faith action against State Farm.65  In the event 
that the Campbells received a favorable judgment against State Farm, 
Ospital’s estate and Slusher were to receive 90% of the verdict.66  The 
court denied the appeal, and State Farm proceeded to pay the entirety of 
the judgment that the jury had entered against the Campbells.67  Despite 
this, the Campbells commenced the bad faith action against State 
Farm.68  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found State Farm liable 
for $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive 
damages.69   
 
 63. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 413.  Prior to trial, State Farm representatives told the Campbells 
that “their assets were safe,” and that State Farm would “represent their interests.” Id. (citing State 
Farm, 65 P.3d at 1142).  After entry of judgment, however, State Farm informed the Campbells  
that they would not pay the additional $135,849, and that the Campbells should sell their home in 
order to pay the judgment.  State Farm, 538 U.S. at 413 (citing State Farm, 65 P.3d at 1142). 
 64. Id. at 413. 
 65. Id.  In exchange for this agreement, Ospital’s estate and Slusher both agreed that they 
would not attempt to collect on their judgment against the Campbells.  Id.  Ospital’s estate and 
Slusher’s attorneys represented the Campbells in the bad faith action, and Slusher and Ospital’s 
estate participated in all decision making activities.  Id. at 413-14.  Additionally, the Campbells 
needed Slusher and Ospital’s estate’s approval in order to settle the bad faith action.  Id. at 414. 
 66. 538 U.S. at 414. 
 67. Id.  State Farm even paid the amount awarded in excess of the policy limits, the amount 
they had originally refused to pay.  Id. 
 68. Id. The complaint alleged “bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.”  Id.  The ensuing trial was bifurcated.  Id. at 414.  The first phase led to a determination 
that State Farm’s denial of Slusher and Ospital’s estate’s settlement offers was unreasonable, 
“because there was a substantial likelihood of an excess verdict.”  Id.  The second phase dealt with 
liability for the fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, as well as the 
determination of compensatory and punitive damages.  Id. 
 69. Id. at 415.  The trial court reduced compensatory damages to $1 million and dramatically 
reduced punitive damages to $25 million, and both sides appealed.  Id. at 415.  The Utah Supreme 
Court then reinstated the original $145 million punitive damages award.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
did note that “[a]mple evidence allowed the jury to find that State Farm’s treatment of the 
Campbells typified its ‘Performance, Planning and Review’ (PP & R) program; implemented by top 
management in 1979, the program had ‘the explicit objective of using the claims-adjustment process 
as a profit center.’” Id. at 431 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 116a).  The Court also acknowledged 
that “‘the Campbells presented considerable evidence’ . . . documenting ‘that the PP & R program . 
. . has functioned, and continues to function, as an unlawful scheme . . . to deny benefits owed 
consumers by paying out less than fair value in order to meet preset, arbitrary payout targets 
designed to enhance corporate profits.’” Id. at 431-32 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 118a-119a.). 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the punitive 
damage award was excessive.70  The Court decided against imposing a 
“bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed,” but 
reasoned that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between 
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy 
due process.”71 With its decision in State Farm, the Supreme Court set 
“the presumptive cap on ratios at 9 to 1” and “subordinated 
reprehensibility to ratio.”72  Essentially, “the decision made ratio the 
initial consideration in any excessiveness analysis. . . .”73 
D.  State Farm’s Legacy and the State of Punitive Damages on the Eve 
of Exxon 
In the aftermath of State Farm,74 some scholars have contended that 
the Court failed to clarify the meaning of the BMW75 guideposts, leading 
to continuing uncertainty in the imposition of punitive damage awards 
and the use of ratios in this field.76  While many courts looked to the 
guideposts set out by the Supreme Court in BMW and State Farm, other 
courts did not strictly adhere to the ratio guidepost in some cases, 
including the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the infamous 2003 
case of Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc.77  
Mathias involved a suit brought by plaintiffs who suffered bed bug 
bites while staying at defendant’s motel.78  Following the trial, the jury 
 
 70. Id. at 429 (“An application of the Gore guideposts to the facts of this case, especially in 
light of the substantial compensatory damages awarded (a portion of which contained a punitive 
element), likely would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount of compensatory 
damages.  The punitive award of $145 million therefore was neither reasonable nor proportionate to 
the wrong committed, and it was an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the 
defendant.”). 
 71. Id. at 425 (emphasis added). 
 72. Lund, supra note 42, at 982, 984. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 75. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 76. Chanenson & Gotanda, supra note 17, at 443 (“Unfortunately, State Farm failed to 
provide courts with a clear set of directions on how to apply the three guideposts.”).  While the 
Supreme Court intended to “illuminate a path for lower courts to follow” in examining whether 
punitive damage awards were excessive, “the Court’s guideposts have not produced a workable and 
predictable test for determining the constitutionality of large punitive awards.”  Id. at 466. 
 77. 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir.). 
 78. Id. at 674.  Motel management was well aware of the bed bug problem, and they 
acknowledged that they had a “major problem with bed bugs.”  Id. at 675.  The motel owners 
designated certain rooms as “[d]o not rent, bugs in room,” but desk clerks frequently rented these 
rooms out anyway, despite the known infestation problems.  Id. 
12
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awarded plaintiffs $186,000 in punitive damages, despite the fact that it 
had only awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages.79  The Seventh 
Circuit looked to State Farm but distinguished it from this case because 
the State Farm plaintiffs received a large compensatory award, while the 
plaintiffs’ award here was smaller because the plaintiffs’ damages were 
partially emotional in nature and more difficult to quantify.80  The Court 
concluded that “[t]he judicial function is to police a range, not a point,” 
and upheld the punitive damage award, which represented a 37.2-to-1 
ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages.81  The Mathias holding 
shows that even after the State Farm single-digit maximum-multiple 
decision, courts were still willing to look beyond a single digit ratio in 
certain circumstances.82 
 
 79. Id. at 674. 
 80. Id. at 677 (“The defendant’s behavior was outrageous but the compensable harm done was 
slight and at the same time difficult to quantify because a large element of it was emotional. And the 
defendant may well have profited from its misconduct because by concealing the infestation it was 
able to keep renting rooms. Refunds were frequent but may have cost less than the cost of closing 
the hotel for a thorough fumigation . . . .  The award of punitive damages in this case thus serves the 
additional purpose of limiting the defendant’s ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection . 
. . . If a tortfeasor is ‘caught’ only half the time he commits torts, then when he is caught he should 
be punished twice as heavily in order to make up for the times he gets away.”).  The likelihood of 
detection argument could lead one to conclude that the award of any punitive damages in Exxon was 
improper, as the massive oil spill would not have been able to escape detection.  See, e.g., A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 11 HARV. L. REV. 
869, 874 (1998) (“[S]uppose the gross negligence of the firm that is responsible for treating the 
waste at the dump site leads to a substantial and highly visible spill form the firm’s waste storage 
tanks.  Punitive damages would not be appropriate because the firm is unlikely to escape detection 
and liability for this harm.”). 
 81. Id. at 678. 
 82. Despite the decision in Mathias, many courts have successfully used the ratio guidepost to 
limit punitive damages awards that exceed the single-digit ratio.  Lund, supra note 42, at 985 
(“[L]ower courts have adapted surprisingly well to the muddled state of affairs left by State Farm.  
These courts are vigorously using the ratio guidepost to constrain punitive damage awards, in line 
with a concern for non-arbitrariness.”).  In support of this assertion, Lund pointed to McClain v. 
Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1230 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (limiting punitive damages 
awards to a nine to one ratio) and Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., L.P., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 974 
(N.D. Iowa 2003) (asserting that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages could not exceed 
ten to one).  Lund, supra note 42, at 985-86.  In another more recent decision, Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, the Supreme Court refused to address whether a punitive damage award of $79.5 million 
was grossly excessive when compensatory damages were only $821,000.  549 U.S. 346, 350 (2007).  
This case arose out of the death of Jesse Williams, a smoker whose death was caused from smoking 
Marlboro cigarettes.  Id. at 349-50.  Williams’ wife brought an action for negligence and deceit, 
alleging Williams smoked because he believed it was safe, and that the defendant deceived him into 
believing the same.  Id.  The jury found defendant negligent and guilty of deceit, and awarded 
damages to Plaintiff.  Id. at 350.  After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court did not address the 
excessiveness issue, as it found that the Oregon court applied the wrong constitutional standard, and 
“[b]ecause the application of this standard may lead to the need for a new trial, or a change in the 
13
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E.  Notable Maritime Cases and the Federal Common Law 
While BMW and State Farm set standards that “involved 
constitutional limits on punitive damages awards,” no such standard 
existed under maritime law.83  In an old maritime case that was decided 
in 1818, The Amiable Nancy,84 the Supreme Court decided that ship 
owners were not liable in “vindictive damages” when their crew 
boarded, robbed, and plundered the plaintiff’s ship.85  The Court did 
assert that “if this were a suit against the original wrong-doers, it might 
be proper to go yet farther, and visit upon them in the shape of 
exemplary damages, the proper punishment which belongs to such 
lawless misconduct.”86   
Over two centuries later, in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,87 the 
Supreme Court “laid a foundation” upon which punitive damages could 
be eliminated under maritime law, specifically with regards to personal 
injury and wrongful death actions.88  The Court reasoned that unlike the 
common law, “[m]aritime law has not been firmly committed to 
awarding punitive damages, but it has demonstrated a fidelity to the 
ideals of uniformity and predictability in its substantive law.”89  After 
the Miles decision, questions arose as to whether the Court would 
preclude punitive damages in all maritime cases.90 
 
level of the punitive damages award.”  Id. at 1065.  Despite their failure to make a ruling on this 
issue, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court previously remanded this case in 2003, “in light of” 
its ruling in State Farm.  Id. at 1061 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408 (2003) and Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007)). 
 83. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Narrow Ruling on Punitive Damages, TRIAL, Sept. 2008, at 62.   
 84. 16 U.S. 546 (1818).  Defendant Exxon Shipping Co. relied on this case in Exxon Shipping 
Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008).  See supra Part II.C. 
 85. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. at 558-59.  The owners of the ship did not actively 
participate in the wrongdoing and were “only constructively liable,” and were not liable to pay 
punitive damages.  Id. at 556. 
 86. Id. at 558. 
 87. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).   
 88. Thomas M. DiBiagio, Fostering Uniform Substantive Law and Recovery—The Demise of 
Punitive Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Personal Injury and Death Claims, 25 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1995).  In Miles, the Court held that damages in maritime wrongful death cases are 
limited to pecuniary damages.  480 U.S. at 31.   
 89. DiBiagio, supra note 88, at 3.  According to DiBiagio, “Miles’s holding was based on the 
desire to foster an ordered system of recovery in admiralty and maritime personal injury and death 
actions.” Id. at 3-4.  “The Miles decision was intended to eliminate inconsistent results.  It should 
follow that in the interest of fostering uniform substantive law, punitive damages would be 
precluded in all maritime claims.” Id. at 27. 
 90. Id. at 31 (“The Supreme Court had begun to move towards fostering uniform substantive 
law and recovery in maritime tort actions and away from a scheme that fortuitously singled out for 
special compensation any victim of wrongful conduct.”).   
14
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Also in the federal common law context, in Browning-Ferris 
Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,91 an antitrust action 
brought in federal court, petitioners argued that the $6 million punitive 
damage award entered against them was “excessive as a matter of 
federal common law.”92  The Supreme Court found that the award was 
not excessive, holding, “[i]t is not our role to review directly the award 
for excessiveness, or to substitute our judgment for that of the jury.”93  
Thus, the Court upheld the award.94 
While these cases provide some perspective, it is important to note 
that the ultimate issue the Supreme Court decided in Exxon Shipping Co. 
v. Baker95 (and the subject of this Note), whether the punitive damages 
awarded to plaintiffs were excessive as a matter of maritime law, was an 
issue of first impression.96 
III.  EXXON SHIPPING CO. V. BAKER 
A.  Statement of the Facts 
“In its simplest terms, Exxon was . . . a case about a company’s 
failure to prevent a known alcoholic from driving a supertanker.”97  On 
March 24, 1989, the grounding of the Exxon Valdez caused 11 million 
gallons of crude oil to spill into the Prince William Sound, flooding “one 
of the nation’s most sensitive ecosystems”98 in a few hours.99  At the 
 
 91. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).   
 92. Id. at 277.  The issue in this case was “whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment applies to a civil-jury award of punitive or exemplary damages, and, if so, whether an 
award of $6 million was excessive in this particular case.”  Id. at 259.   
 93. Id. at 278.   
 94. Id.  The Court also held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment “does 
not apply to awards of punitive damages in cases between private parties.”  Id. at 260.  The Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 95. 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008). 
 96. Id. at 2619.   
 97. Fisher, supra note 17, at 34. 
 98. Samuel K. Skinner & William K. Reilley,The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Report to the 
President 1, (1989), http://www.akrrt.org/Archives/Response_Reports/ExxonValdez_NRT_ 
1989.pdf. (“In his statement of March 30, the President described the Exxon Valdez oil spill as ‘an 
environmental tragedy.’ The incident has both short-term and long-term implications. Prince 
William Sound is a region rich in biological diversity, and the oil spill has caused ecological harm. 
The spill has affected directly the livelihoods of many Alaskans. It also has impaired the beauty of a 
spectacular wild area . . . .”).  The fact that it took place in a “remote location,” and that over ten 
hours passed before equipment arrived to control the spill compounded the effects of the spill, and 
made cleanup efforts more difficult.  Id. at 2.  Furthermore, “the sheer size of the spill . . . was larger 
than contingency planning had anticipated” and “[t]he magnitude of the spill was beyond the 
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time of the incident, Joseph Hazelwood,100 a known alcoholic, was the 
captain of the Exxon Valdez.101  Before leaving port, Hazelwood 
consumed “at least five double vodkas,”102  and was likely drunk at the 
time of the spill.103  The crew faced poor conditions en route, which 
prompted Hazelwood to contact the Coast Guard for permission to 
change course to avoid ice.104  The new course put the ship in danger of 
hitting a reef and required the crew to turn the ship back into the 
shipping lane.105  Just before the turn was to occur, Hazelwood 
inexplicably and unexpectedly said he was going to do paperwork and 
retired to his cabin.106  Hazelwood’s absence created two problems, as 
 
physical capability of skimmers and booms [then] being used in the United States.” Id. See also 
Wendy Rose Parcells, Note, A Monumental Decision or Just an Environmental Catastrophe? An In-
Depth Look at the Ramifications and Shortcomings of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 16 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2008) (describing the spill and stating: “[t]he 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill was not merely an environmental catastrophe that destroyed beaches, 
polluted Alaskan coastal waters, and harmed animal habitats, but it also economically harmed thirty 
two thousand fisherman, cannery workers and landowners, and involved those people in over 
seventeen years of litigation.”).  In oral arguments, even Exxon’s attorney, Walter Dellinger, 
referred to the spill as “one of the worst environmental tragedies in U.S. maritime history.”  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219), 2008 WL 
534746 at *3. 
 99. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2612-13. The Exxon Valdez was an oil carrying 
supertanker that grounded on the Bligh Reef near the Alaskan coast. Id. At the time of the spill, the 
ship was carrying 53 million gallons of crude oil, which is equal to over one million barrels.  Id. at 
2612.  For a more detailed history of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, See Brandon T. Morris, Comment, 
Oil, Money, and the Environment: Punitive Damages Under Due Process, Preemption, and 
Maritime Law in the Wake of the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 33 TUL. MAR. L.J. 165, 167-71 (2008).   
 100. According to one scholar, “Captain Joseph Hazelwood has now entered the Tort Law Hall 
of Fame, right next to Helen Palsgraf . . . .”  Charles S. Doskow, What Do You Do with a Drunken 
Sailor? Reprehensibility, the Exxon Valdez, and Punitive Damages, 27 QLR 465 (2009). 
 101. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001). Witnesses testified that “the 
highest executives in Exxon Shipping knew Hazelwood had an alcohol problem, knew he had been 
treated for it, and knew that he had fallen off the wagon and was drinking on board their ships and 
in waterfront bars.” Id.  See also Brief for Respondents at 4-5, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605 
(No. 07-219), 2008 WL 194284, at *4-5 (“Although on paper Exxon had an alcohol policy that 
prohibited drinking aboard ship, it did not enforce the policy . . . .”). 
 102. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2612. Witnesses spotted Hazelwood drinking at a bar in 
Valdez prior to the spill.  Id.  
 103. Id.  Hazelwood allegedly consumed enough alcohol “that a non-alcoholic would have 
passed out.” Id. (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1236).   
 104. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2612.  The Court says this was a “standard move,” and 
that the last ship had done the same thing. Id. 
 105. Id.  Due to the move, the Exxon Valdez was traveling in the path of the Bligh Island Reef. 
Id. 
 106. Id.  Hazelwood gave no explanation for his sudden need to do paperwork two minutes 
before the turn was supposed to occur.  Id.  In fact, expert testimony established that paperwork was 
no excuse for his absence, as the turn would have been a difficult maneuver.  Id. 
16
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(1) he was the only person on the ship with a license to navigate these 
waters; and (2) he had put the ship on autopilot, making it more difficult 
for the remaining crew members to navigate.107   
Unfortunately, in the captain’s absence, the crew failed to turn the 
Exxon Valdez, and was unable to avoid grounding the ship on the reef, 
causing the hull to tear and the oil to spill.108  After the ship struck the 
reef, Captain Hazelwood returned from his cabin and contacted the 
Coast Guard.109  Tests showed that Hazelwood’s blood alcohol level was 
still .061 approximately eleven hours after the accident.110  According to 
expert testimony, this meant that Hazelwood “must have been deeply 
under the influence” when the tanker grounded.111 
B.  Procedural History and Lower and Appellate Court Decisions 
As a result of the spill, Exxon Shipping Co. and Exxon Mobil Corp. 
faced multiple criminal violations, and spent approximately $2.1 billion 
in clean-up costs.112  Exxon negotiated a consent decree in the amount of 
$900 million as a result of a civil suit brought by the United States and 
Alaska.113  Exxon also paid $303 million in “voluntary settlements.”114   
Grant Baker and other individuals brought an action for economic 
losses suffered as a result of the damage to the Prince William Sound, 
and the Court consolidated all of the remaining civil cases into Exxon 
 
 107. Id.  Putting the tanker on autopilot caused it to speed up and made it more difficult for the 
crew to turn the ship or to correct any mistakes.  Id.  
 108. Id. at 2612-13.  In Hazelwood’s absence, third mate Joseph Cousins and helmsman Robert 
Kagan, neither of whom had licenses to navigate these waters, had to steer the ship.  Id. at 2612.  It 
is unknown exactly why they were unable to make the turn.  Id.   
 109. Id. at 2613.  Following the spill, Hazelwood attempted to rock the ship off of the Bligh 
Island Reef.  Id.  Had he been successful, it is likely that even more oil would have spilled into the 
Sound.  Id.  Luckily, he was not successful.  Id.   
 110. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1248.  At the time of the spill, Hazelwood’s blood-
alcohol level was approximately .241.  Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2613 (citing In re Exxon 
Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, Order No. 265 (D. Alaska, Jan. 27, 1995) p. 5, App. F to Pet. for Cert. 
255a-256a).  This is over three times the legal limit for driving a vehicle in most states.  Id. 
 111. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1248.  Exxon disputed the validity of the blood alcohol 
test, and filed a motion in limine to exclude the evidence.  Id.  
 112. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2613.  Criminal violations included violations of: the 
Clean Water Act; the Refuse Act of 1899; the Migratory Bird Treaty Act; the Ports and Waterways 
Safety Act; and the Dangerous Cargo Act.  Id. 
 113. Id.  This money was for “restoring natural resources.” Id. 
 114. Id.  Exxon settled “with fishermen, property owners, and other private parties.” Id. 
17
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Shipping Co. v. Baker.115  The District Court for the District of Alaska 
separated plaintiffs into the three distinct classes of: (1) “commercial 
fishermen;” (2) “Native Alaskans;” and (3) “landowners.”116  The Court 
also certified a “mandatory class” of over 32,000 plaintiffs seeking 
punitive damages.117  Exxon stipulated to liability for compensatory 
damages,118  and “[a]fter years of discovery, the parties tried the case to 
a jury in 1994.119 The trial comprised three phases, over 83 trial days 
(filling 7,714 pages of transcript), with 155 witnesses and 1,109 
exhibits.”120  The trial was structured so that defendants’ recklessness 
and potential punitive damage liability were tried first, followed by 
compensatory damage considerations and, finally, a determination of 
punitive damages.121   
The District Court instructed that “[a] corporation is not responsible 
for the reckless acts of all of its employees,” but that an employer is 
responsible for the reckless acts of “those employees who are employed 
in a managerial capacity while acting in the scope of their 
employment.”122  The court defined a “managerial capacity” employee 
as one who “supervises other employees and has responsibility for, and 
authority over, a particular aspect of the corporation’s business.”123  The 
jury found Hazelwood and Exxon reckless and potentially liable for 
punitive damages.124  The jury went on to award the commercial 
 
 115. Id. Plaintiffs in this case included commercial fisherman, Native Alaskans, and 
landowners; defendants included Exxon Corp., Exxon Shipping Co., and Hazelwood.  In re Exxon 
Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1215.   
 116. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2613.   
 117. Id. The Court created this class at Exxon’s request.  Id.  All of the plaintiffs in Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker were members of this mandatory class.  Id.  In Eyak Native Village v. Exxon 
Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described the plaintiffs as “including 
commercial fishermen whose fishing grounds were damaged by the oil, Alaska Natives who subsist 
on various fish and other resources, processors of fish harvested from the affected area, employees 
of processors, area businesses and land owners, and other injured persons.” 25 F.3d 773, 775 
(1994).   
 118. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2613 (“For the purposes of the case, Exxon stipulated to 
its negligence in the Valdez disaster and its ensuing liability for compensatory damages.”). 
 119. Brief for Respondents at 12, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2008 WL 194284, at 
*12. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  The District Court also planned for a fourth trial phase to determine compensation for 
the remaining plaintiffs, but the settlement agreement rendered this phase unnecessary.  Id.   
 122. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1233.   
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 1225.    
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fisherman $287 million in compensatory damages.125  The Native 
Alaskan claims settled for $20 million, and the Alaskans who opted out 
of the class eventually reached a settlement of approximately $2.6 
million.126  In the end, the jury also awarded $5,000 in punitive damages 
against Hazelwood and $5 billion in punitive damages against Exxon.127   
In 2001, Exxon appealed from the $5 billion dollar punitive damage 
award in favor of the commercial fishermen to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.128  The Court remanded twice to adjust the award and 
eventually reduced the punitive damage award to $2.5 billion in light of 
the Supreme Court’s due process decisions.129  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in order to decide: (1) whether a corporation may be 
liable in punitive damages for the acts of managerial employees under 
maritime law; (2) whether the Clean Water Act130 preempted punitive 
damages; and (3) whether the award against Exxon was “excessive as a 
matter of maritime common law.”131  This Note focuses on the third 
question the Supreme Court faced: whether the award against Exxon was 
excessive under maritime common law.132   
C.  The Supreme Court’s Holding and Reasoning 
With regards to the first issue, whether Exxon was liable in punitive 
damages for Hazelwood’s acts, Exxon claimed the lower court’s jury 
instruction was erroneous.133  In support of this contention, Exxon 
 
 125. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2614.  The “balance outstanding” was determined to be 
$19,590,257 after the court accounted for “released claims, settlements, and other payments.” Id.   
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  At the time, the $5 billion dollar punitive damage award against Exxon represented 
“the largest punitive damage award in American history.”  In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1225.   
 128. In re Exxon Valdez,  270 F.3d at 1221.  The jury could not award damages for 
“environmental harm” in this case because “under a stipulation with the United States and Alaska, 
Exxon had already been punished for environmental harm.”  Id. at 1221 (citing Eyak Native Vill. v. 
Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1994)).  As such, “[t]he verdict in this case was for damage 
to economic expectations for commercial fishermen.” Id. at 1221. 
 129. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2614.  
 130. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000). 
 131. Exxon Shipping Co.. 128 S.Ct. at 2614-15.   
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2615.  Baker countered this argument by pointing out the fact that the imposition of 
punitive damages occurred after the final phase of the trial, where plaintiffs provided the jury with 
evidence of “the recklessness of company officials in supervising Hazelwood and enforcing 
Exxon’s alcohol policies.” Id. at 2615 n.3. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 36-39, Exxon Shipping 
Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219), 2008 WL 194284, at *36-39).  Baker contended that, in light of 
this fact, “it is entirely possible that the jury found Exxon reckless in its own right, and in no way 
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presented three cases: The Amiable Nancy,134 a case in which the ship 
owners were not liable for punitive damages because they did not 
“participate in,” “countenance,” or “direct” the wrongful acts of their 
officers;135 Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice,136 where the Court 
reasoned that “[t]hough [a] principal is liable to make compensation for 
[intentional torts] by his agent, he is not liable to be punished by 
exemplary damages for an intent in which he did not participate;”137  and 
Kolstad v. American Dental Association,138 in which the Court held that 
an employer was not liable in punitive damages for his employees’ 
discriminatory acts.139 
Baker argued in favor of the court’s instruction.140  He argued that 
because punitive damages were not at issue in The Amiable Nancy,141 the 
holding and reasoning were dictum and thus not binding.142  He also 
 
predicated its liability for punitive damages on Exxon’s responsibility for Hazelwood’s conduct.” 
Id. 
 134. 16 U.S. 546 (1818). 
 135. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2615 (citing The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546 (1818)).  
The Amiable Nancy was an admiralty action where the officers of The Scourge “robbed and 
plundered” The Amiable Nancy.  16 U.S. at 547.  The Court held that the owners of The Scourge 
were liable to pay compensatory damages to The Amiable Nancy’s owners.  Id. at 558-59.  The 
Court did not award punitive damages, however, as they reasoned that the owners of The Scourge 
were essentially “innocent” because they did not participate in the act, nor did they instruct their 
officers to act in this regard.  Id. at 559. In the opinion, Justice Story concluded that “[u]nder such 
circumstances, we are of opinion, that they are bound to repair all the real injuries and personal 
wrongs sustained by the libellants, but they are not bound to the extent of vindictive damages.” Id.  
 136. 147 U.S. 101 (1893). 
 137. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2616 (quoting Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 
147 U.S. 101, 110 (1893)).  The Supreme Court decided Lake Shore before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
and Exxon argued that Lake Shore represents maritime law, because “maritime law remains federal 
common law.”  Id. at 2616. 
 138. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).   
 139. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2616 (citing Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n., 527 U.S. 
526, 544 (1999)).  The employers were not liable for punitive damages so long as the employer 
could show that they had good faith antidiscrimination measures in place that were “maintained and 
enforced.”  Id. 
 140. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2616.  The instruction followed the Restatement of 
Torts, which recognizes that a corporation can be liable in punitive damages for the reckless acts of 
its managerial employees. Id. (citing  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(c) (1979) 
(“Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal because of an act by 
an agent if, but only if . . . (c)  the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in 
the scope of employment . . . .”)). 
 141. 16 U.S. 546 (1818). 
 142. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2616.  In Lake Shore, the Court “merely rejected 
company liability for the acts of a railroad conductor, while saying nothing about liability for agents 
higher up the ladder, like ship captains.” Id. 
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argued that Lake Shore143 did not address the issue presented in this 
case.144  Additionally, Baker asserted that maritime law should “conform 
to modern land-based common law, where a majority of States allow 
punitive damages for the conduct of any employee.”145   
The Court was equally divided on this issue and was unable to 
order a reversal.146  The Court also found that the Clean Water Act did 
not preempt punitive damages.147  This finding left the issue of whether 
the punitive damage award against Exxon was excessive under maritime 
law, an issue of first impression and the focus of the remainder of this 
Note.148 
Exxon argued that the punitive award “exceeds the bounds justified 
by the punitive damages goal of deterring reckless (or worse) behavior 
and the consequently heightened threat of harm.”149  The Supreme 
 
 143. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893). 
 144. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2616.  Baker also argued that Lake Shore “was 
criticized for failing to reflect the majority rule of its own time, not to mention its conflict with the 
respondeat superior rule in the overwhelming share of land-based jurisdictions today.” Id. 
 145. Id.  Of the remainder of the states, most follow the Restatement approach, which holds 
employers liable in punitive damages for the reckless acts of its managerial employees. Id. 
 146. Id.  “The Court is equally divided on this question, and ‘[i]f the judges are divided, the 
reversal cannot be had for no order can be made.’” Id. (quoting Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. 107, 
112 (1869)). 
 147. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2617.  The Supreme Court said that while they agreed 
with the Ninth Circuit Court’s conclusion regarding this matter, they did not agree with its 
reasoning.  Id.  Instead, the Supreme Court believed that the preemption argument failed because 
“we find it too hard to conclude that a statute expressly geared to protecting ‘water,’ ‘shorelines,’ 
and ‘natural resources’ was intended to eliminate sub silentio oil companies’ common law duties to 
refrain from injuring the bodies and livelihoods of private individuals.” Id. at 2619.  The Court also 
said that they saw “no clear indication of congressional intent to occupy the entire field of pollution 
remedies.” Id. 
 148. Id. at 2619.  The Court noted that this issue was within the federal court’s jurisdiction. Id. 
 149. Id. at 2619-20. While Exxon argued that the Clean Water Act preempted the award, it did 
not give any other argument that punitive damages were improper as a matter of maritime law. Id. at 
2619.  In oral argument, Exxon’s counsel also argued that punitive damages were not necessary to 
deter in this case, reasoning: “but here I think that it is incumbent upon the Plaintiffs to show why 
you need deterrence when there was no profit motive, and you’ve had to pay 3.4 million dollars. 
And when if you look to punishment, that can’t be a black hole into which all the limits on punitive 
damages disappear.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605 (No. 
07-219), 2008 WL 534746 at *35.  Plaintiffs’ counsel, Jeffrey Fisher, countered by stating: “[T]he 
chairman of Exxon took the stand in trial and gave the jury a chart of all the money that Exxon had 
paid out of its pocket and told the jury: We’ve been deterred enough, so you shouldn’t award any 
punitive damages. And the jury, of course, rejected that argument that Exxon made.”  Id. Plaintiffs’ 
counsel also pointed out that “Exxon fired one person -- Captain Hazelwood. They reassigned the 
third mate. Everybody else up -- further up the chain of command who allowed this to happen 
received bonuses and raises. They have taken no action inside the company to express in any 
meaningful way that they’ve been deterred by what happened in this incident . . . .”  Id.   
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Court’s analysis included a discussion of the history of punitive 
damages.150 In the opinion, the Court wrote that in today’s jurisprudence, 
courts award punitive damages to further the “twin goals” of achieving 
retribution on behalf of the plaintiffs and deterring “harmful conduct” on 
the part of the defendants.151  The Exxon Court admitted that punitive 
damages have been subject to criticism,152 but it reasoned that there have 
not been “mass-produced runaway awards,” and that “the median ratio 
of punitive to compensatory awards has remained less than 1:1.”153  
These considerations led the Supreme Court to conclude that the real 
problem was not the amounts of the punitive damage awards, but the 
fact that these awards were unpredictable.154 
The analysis then turned to State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell,155 the due process case where the Supreme 
Court decided in favor of a “single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages.”156  The Exxon Court concluded that the 
imposition of a “ratio or maximum multiple” by which to determine 
punitive damages in relation to the compensatory damages awarded 
 
 150. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct.. at 2620.  The Court noted that punitive damages date back 
to 1763 and also mentioned that there was a similar concept used in the Code of Hammurabi.  Id.  
The Court also referred to punitive damages as “a common law innovation untethered to strict 
numerical multipliers.” Id.  
 151. Id. at 2620-21.  The Court noted that several states have statutes designed to regulate 
punitive damages, and some have even capped maximum awards. Id. at 2623.  Regardless, punitive 
damages are higher, and American courts award them more often than courts in any other nation.  
Id. at 2623.  
 152. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 517 (“For well over a 
century, controversy has surrounded exemplary damages.”).   
 153. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2624.  “The figures thus show an overall restraint and 
suggest that in many instances a high ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is substantially 
greater than necessary to punish or deter.” Id. at 2624-25.  It should be noted that the studies that 
produced the median ratio the Exxon Court relied upon “cover cases of the most as well as the least 
blameworthy conduct triggering punitive liability, from malice and avarice, down to recklessness, 
and even gross negligence in some jurisdictions.” Id. at 2633.   
 154. Id. at 2625 (“The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive 
awards.”).  The Court focused on the goals of fairness and consistency, and said: “[w]e are aware of 
no scholarly work pointing to consistency across punitive awards in cases involving similar claims 
and circumstances.” Id. at 2625-26.  Further, the Court concluded that “a penalty should be 
reasonably predictable in its severity.” Id. at 2627.  The Court also looked to Mathias v. Accor 
Economy Lodging, Inc., where the court said that “as there are no punitive damage guidelines . . . it 
is inevitable that the specific amount of punitive damages awarded whether by judge or by jury will 
be arbitrary.” Id. at 2629 (quoting Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th 
Cir. 2003)). 
 155. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).   
 156. Exxon Shipping Co. at 2626 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408, 425 (2003)).   
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would be a workable solution.157  Because the compensatory damages 
award is usually greater than the punitive award, the Court ultimately 
concluded that a one-to-one ratio would be fair.158  
In reaching its conclusion, the Court gave much weight to the fact 
that punitive damage awards tend to be lower than compensatory 
awards, and the Court concluded that this trend reflected what judges 
and juries had deemed reasonable in hundreds of cases.159  In the 
opinion, the Court set forth and examined alternate means of deciding on 
a ratio,160 but the perceived need to protect wrongdoing defendants 
against “unpredictable and unnecessary” punitive damage awards, as 
well as to prevent disruption of the legal system, seemed to push the 
Supreme Court towards its ultimate one-to-one ratio holding.161   
 
 157. Id. at 2629.  The Court supported this rationale with the argument that “[h]istory certainly 
is no support for the notion that judges cannot use numbers.” Id. at 2630. Examples include the rule 
against perpetuities. Id.  The Court also reasoned that “[w]here there is a need for a new remedial 
maritime rule, past precedent argues for our setting a judicially derived standard, subject of course 
to congressional revision.”  Id. at 2630 n21.   
 158. Id. at 2633.  In State Farm, the Court held that “a single digit maximum is appropriate in 
all but the most exceptional of cases.” Id. at 2634 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. 
at 425). As such, the award of $2.5 billion in this case could not stand, and the court vacated the 
judgment and remanded the case.  Id. at 2634.  It should be noted that “[a]lthough the holding in 
Exxon Shipping applies only in the narrow context of punitive damages in maritime cases, Souter’s 
reasoning was less about maritime law and more about the need for predictable and consistent rules 
for punitive damages awards.”  Chemerinsky, supra note 83, at 62.  
 159. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2632-33 (“We think it is fair to assume that the greater 
share of the verdicts studied in these comprehensive collections reflect reasonable judgments about 
the economic penalties appropriate in their particular cases.”).   
 160. See id. at 2631-33 (“Although the legal landscape is well populated with examples of 
ratios and multipliers expressing policies of retribution and deterrence, most of them suffer from 
features that stand in the way of borrowing them as paradigms of reasonable limitations suited for 
application to this case.”).  The Exxon Court looked to (and ultimately rejected) the 3:1 ratio that 
existed in the majority of states, declaring that “a legislative judgment that 3:1 is a reasonable limit 
overall is not a judgment that 3:1 is a reasonable limit in this particular type of case.” Id. at 2632.  In 
rejecting the 3:1 ratio, the court mainly relied on the fact that the states that utilized this ratio 
applied the awards to cases involving much more “egregious” conduct than that of Exxon in Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker.  Id. at 2631.  Thus, the court weighed the fact that Exxon had only acted 
“recklessly” in this case, and consequently determined that Exxon should not have been subjected to 
this higher ratio for its less severe culpable conduct.  Id. at 2632-33.  The Court also considered the 
2:1 ratio that appeared in treble damage statutes, but decided that “the legislative signposts do not 
point the way clearly to 2:1 as a sound indication of a reasonable limit.”  Id. at 2632.   
 161. Id. at 2633.  The Court also supported its reasoning by turning to the daily fines provision 
of the Clean Water Act.  See id. at 2634 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)-(2) (2000)).  In the Clean 
Water Act, Congress imposed a daily penalty of $25,000 for “negligent violations of pollution 
restrictions,” and as much as $50,000 per day for “knowing” violations.  Id.  This led the Exxon 
Court to draw an analogy to punitive damages and conclude that “[d]iscretion to double the penalty 
for knowing action compares to discretion to double the civil penalty on conduct going beyond 
negligence and meriting punitive treatment.” Id.  The Court also supported its decision by asserting 
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D.  Justice Scalia’s Concurrence 
Justice Scalia agreed with the majority’s interpretation of 
precedential cases that refer to the constitutional limits of punitive 
damages, but he contended that “the holdings were in error.”162  Justice 
Scalia specifically pointed to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Campbell.163  Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in the State 
Farm case, arguing that “the Due Process Clause provides no 
substantive protections against ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ awards of 
punitive damages.”164   
E.  Justice Stevens’ Opinion, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part 
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens reasoned 
that “[e]vidence that Congress has affirmatively chosen not to restrict the 
availability of a particular remedy favors adherence to a policy of 
judicial restraint,” and stated that he would affirm the District Court’s 
decision under the “traditional abuse-of-discretion standard.”165  Justice 
Stevens also asserted that maritime law places limits on compensatory 
 
that “[t]he common law traditionally did not compensate purely economic harms, unaccompanied 
by injury to person or property,” and that the only reason plaintiffs received any compensation in 
this case was due to a “judicial creation.” Id. at 2630 n.21.  This led the Exxon Court to comment on 
“the entirely judge-made nature” of the field, and provided support for its eventual, judicially 
created imposition of a one-to-one ratio.  Id.  
 162. Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
 163. 538 U.S. 408.  In this case, the issue was whether a punitive damage award of $145 
million was excessive and violated due process when the compensatory damage award was only $1 
million. Id. at 412.  The Court found the punitive damage award excessive, as “courts must ensure 
that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the 
plaintiff and to the general damages recovered. In the context of this case, we have no doubt that 
there is a presumption against an award that has a 145-to-1 ratio.” Id. at 426.   
 164. Id. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598-
99 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 165. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2635 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Stevens wrote that “[t]he Court not only fails to offer any such justification, but also ignores 
the particular feature of maritime law that may counsel against imposing the sort of limitation the 
Court announces today.” Id. Stevens also cited Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., where the Court held 
that “an admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the well-considered boundaries imposed by 
federal legislation.” Id. (quoting Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990)). Stevens 
cited the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act to show the error of the Court’s holding. Id. at 
2635 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 46 U.S.C.A. § 30505 (2006)). 
Stevens concluded that because there are numerous statutes that govern admiralty law, the fact that 
Congress has not set out any limitation on punitive damages shows that the Court’s decision goes 
against Congressional intent. Id. at 2636 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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damages,166 and, thus, the Supreme Court should not take actions to limit 
punitive damages as well.167  While he believed that the Supreme Court 
had the power to make the ruling in this case, Justice Stevens concluded 
that it was erroneous for the Court to do so.168 
F.  Justice Ginsburg’s Opinion, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in 
Part 
Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice Stevens’ concurring and 
dissenting opinion, and reasoned that the Supreme Court should have 
left the decision to impose a ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages 
to Congress.169  In support of this conclusion, Justice Ginsburg pointed 
to numerous questions that could possibly arise as to the impact of the 
Court’s decision in this case.170  Justice Ginsburg also noted that the 
 
 166. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 17, at 33 (“Through a limitation on the doctrine of 
foreseeability, maritime law forbids tort plaintiffs from recovering certain economically remote and 
all intangible (or psychological) injuries that are recoverable in other tort systems.  The upshot of 
maritime law’s limited availability of compensatory damages meant that hundreds of millions, if not 
billions, of dollars of harm were unaccounted for in the Exxon plaintiffs’ compensatory recoveries.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  Professor Fisher goes on to state: 
Commercial fishermen, for instance, were unable to recover for the devaluation in their 
fishing permits to the tune of tens of thousands of dollars per permit. Other fishermen 
were unable to recover for “price diminishment in fisheries that were not oiled” or 
“diminution of market value owing to fear or stigma.” Exxon Shipping, 120 F.3d at 167 
n.3. Landowners whose land was not oiled were left uncompensated for reductions in 
their land’s value. Id. The tourist industry was unable to recover for the loss of tens of 
millions in revenue when would-be visitors stayed home after the spill. Perhaps most 
significantly, residents across the region were unable to recover for any of their profound 
emotional and psychological harms. The spill exacted an especially severe psychological 
toll on Alaska Natives. For these individuals, “subsistence fishing is not merely a way to 
feed their families but an important part of their culture.”  
Id. at n. 170 (citations omitted). 
 167. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2636-37 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). “Under maritime law, then, more than in the land-tort context, punitive damages may serve 
to compensate for certain sorts of intangible injuries not recoverable under the rubric of 
compensation.” Id. at 2637. 
 168. Id. at 2638. “The congressional choice not to limit the availability of punitive damages 
under maritime law should not be viewed as an invitation to make policy judgments on the basis of 
evidence in the public domain that Congress is better able to evaluate than is this Court.” Id. at 
2636.  Justice Stevens goes on to say, “[u]ntil Congress orders us to impose a rigid formula to 
govern the award of punitive damages in maritime cases, I would employ our familiar abuse-of-
discretion standard . . . .” Id. at 2638. 
 169. Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ginsburg felt that “the 
Court’s lawmaking prompts many questions,” and she speculated about how the Court will 
determine what ratio is appropriate in other cases.  Id. 
 170. Id.  Ginsburg asked: “On next opportunity will the Court rule, definitively, that 1:1 is the 
ceiling due process requires in all of the States, and for all federal claims?”  Id.  The fact that she 
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“traditional approach” has not given rise to an outbreak of unchecked, 
excessive punitive damage awards, and did not necessarily need to be 
changed.171 
G.  Justice Breyer’s Opinion, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part 
Justice Breyer reasoned that while the courts needed a standard for 
the imposition of punitive damages, a strict ratio was not the solution.172  
He concluded that the circuit court’s ruling should have been affirmed, 
because “[t]he jury could reasonably have believed that Exxon 
knowingly allowed a relapsed alcoholic repeatedly to pilot a vessel filled 
with millions of gallons of oil through waters that provided the 
livelihood for the many plaintiffs in this case.”173 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The One-to-One Ratio 
While State Farm and BMW most likely influenced the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, Exxon was a maritime 
case, and in making its decision, the Court relied on federal common 
law.174  In holding that a one-to-one ratio was a “fair upper limit”175 in 
maritime cases, the Court stressed the need for predictability and 
ultimately broke with State Farm and BMW precedent, both of which 
were constitutionally-based holdings.176  Unfortunately, by exalting 
predictability above the traditional goals of punitive damages, the 
 
was unable to answer this question likely contributed to her conclusion that it was Congress’s duty 
to make a rule regarding this issue.  Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  “Legal standards, 
however, can secure these objectives without the rigidity that an absolute fixed numerical ratio 
demands.” Id.  Breyer also mentioned the fact that the lower court had already cut the punitive 
damage award in half.  Id. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. at 2616 (majority opinion).  As previously stated, the issue of punitive damages under 
maritime law was an issue of first impression.  Id. at 2619.   
 175. Id. at 2633.   
 176. Id. at 2626 (“Today’s enquiry differs from due process review because the case arises 
under federal maritime jurisdiction, and we are reviewing a jury award for conformity with 
maritime law, rather than the outer limit allowed by due process; we are examining the verdict in 
the exercise of federal maritime common law authority, which precedes and should obviate any 
application of the constitutional standard. Our due process cases, on the contrary, have all involved 
awards subject in the first instance to state law.”). 
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Supreme Court’s unprecedented177 one-to-one ratio defeats the purpose 
of punitive damages by diluting the potential for deterrence and making 
these awards far too predictable for wrongdoing defendants.   
This leads one to ask: What led the Court to depart from the 
guideposts set forth in BMW178 and abandon the single-digit maximum-
multiple formula set out in State Farm?179  In light of the fact that the 
defendant here was Exxon Shipping, a major corporation, some have 
concluded that this decision was the product of a conservative Court that 
placed the interests of business above the need to punish and deter 
wrongful conduct.180   
This possible bias certainly may have played a role in the Court’s 
decision, which appears to be much more concerned with protecting 
Exxon than with deterring other corporations from acting similarly.  
Indeed, one writer has concluded that “[t]he final installment in Exxon’s 
nineteen-year legal odyssey, resulting from Joseph Hazelwood’s 
inebriation and Exxon’s oversights, ended almost as favorably as the oil 
 
 177. In his dissent, Justice Stevens pointed out the fact that “the Court fails to identify a single 
state court that has imposed a precise ratio, as the Court does today, under its common-law 
authority.” Id. at 2637 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 178. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).  See supra Part II.C.1.  
 179. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). Moreover, Justice 
Stevens pointed out in his concurrence and dissent that: “The Court concludes that the real problem 
is large outlier awards, and the data seem to bear this out.  But the Court never explains why abuse-
of-discretion review is not the precise antidote to the unfairness inherent in such excessive awards.”  
Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2638 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Justice Stevens then points to Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, where the Court wrote:  
Under the traditional common law approach, the amount of the punitive award is initially 
determined by a jury instructed to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter 
similar wrongful conduct.  The jury’s determination is then reviewed by trial and 
appellate courts to ensure that it is reasonable. 
Id. at 2638 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991)).   
 180. Professor Tracy Thomas believes that in recent cases, the Supreme Court has revealed that 
it is “biased against what it sees as greedy plaintiffs overreaching the intentions of the law.  Instead, 
the Court is overly concerned about fairness and protection of corporate defendants.”  Posting of 
Tracy Thomas to Akron Law Café, http://www.ohioverticals.com/blogs/ 
akron_law_cafe/2008/07/exxon-saved-from-the-rocks-the-supreme-court-limits-punitive-damages/ 
(July 2, 2008).  See also Tony Mauro, Bush Got a Conservative High Court, With Caveats, LEGAL 
TIMES (2008), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Bush-Got-a-Conservative-High-law-13481680.html. 
(“The Court pleased the business community by slashing the punitive damages stemming from the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker . . . .”).  It should be noted that some scholars 
have argued that punitive damages are generally unable to change or affect the behavior of 
corporations.  See generally Polinksy & Shavell, supra note 80, at  870 (acknowledging that 
“[p]unitive damages against corporations may be ineffective primarily because the payment of 
punitive damages awards by corporations often does not lead to greater punishment of culpable 
employees, but instead punishes the corporation’s shareholders and customers.”).   
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giant could have hoped.”181  Of course, in the majority opinion, the 
Exxon Court heavily emphasizes the need for “fairness” and implies that 
punitive damages are better able to deter when punitive damage awards 
are “reasonably predictable” so that defendants can weigh the potential 
punitive effects of their wrongful actions.182  While the predictability 
argument is reasonable, as a matter of common sense it seems inherently 
logical that larger, more “punitive” punitive damage awards will be 
more likely to deter defendants than smaller ones.183 
Consequently, and in light of the tremendous amount of damage 
done to the Prince William Sound and the plaintiffs in Exxon Shipping 
Co. v. Baker,184 one might be inclined to ask, for whom is this decision 
“fair,” and who will this decision deter?  In this case, while the Supreme 
Court’s holding may have been favorable to Exxon, the punitive award 
to plaintiffs was reduced to one-fifth of what the appellate court deemed 
appropriate ($2.5 billion) and a mere one-tenth of the jury’s original 
punitive damage award of $5 billion.185  As counsel for plaintiffs argued 
in their appellate brief: 
The facts as the jury, the district court, and the Ninth Circuit . . . found 
them – coupled with the extraordinary procedural protections and post-
trial reviews Exxon received – demonstrate that the punitive award 
was predictable, proportionate, and justified. That the award is larger 
than previous maritime awards simply reflects the unprecedented 
scope of harm that Exxon’s highly reprehensible conduct inflicted and 
the unique class proceeding that took place at Exxon’s request.186 
 
 181. Note, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker: The Supreme Court Tightens the Purse Strings on 
Corporate Punitive Awards, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 141 (2008).   
 182. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2625-26.  See Brief for Respondents at 2-3, Exxon 
Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219), 2008 WL 194284, at *2-3 (“The 83-day, three-phase 
trial and subsequent appeals established that 32,677 claimants suffered an average of about $15,500 
in recoverable economic harm, apart from substantial unrecoverable economic and non-economic 
harm. Plaintiffs were awarded an average of approximately $76,500 each in punitive damages–just 
less than five times their average compensable economic harm. The aggregate punitive judgment 
stands at $2.5 billion, or about three weeks of Exxon’s current net profits.”).   
 183. It would seem that a punitive award that could be as much as nine times as high as the 
compensatory award will be more likely to deter a defendant than a punitive award that is simply 
equal to the compensatory award.  
 184. See supra Part III.A (discussing damage caused by the oil spill).  
 185. See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 186. See Brief for Respondents at 52, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219), 2008 
WL 194284, at *52.   
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In a case where the harm done was “unprecedented,” it seems 
ludicrous for the Supreme Court to set forth an unprecedented and 
restrictive ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages.  
In support of its holding, the Exxon Court also cited to the State 
Farm decision, which said: “[w]hen compensatory damages are 
substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory 
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.”187  
In relying on this language from State Farm, the Court stated that “a 
class recovery of $500 million is substantial.”188  The Exxon Court 
provided no support for this statement, and simply relied upon the sheer 
size of the number to show its substantiality.  Despite the size of the 
number, it is certainly debatable whether the compensatory damage 
award in this case really was “substantial,” and what exactly the State 
Farm Court actually meant by “substantial.”189  
In their concurring and dissenting opinions, both Justice Ginsburg 
and Justice Stevens concluded that the Court should have left the 
decision to impose a ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages up to 
 
 187. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2634 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)).   
 188. Id. at 2634 n.28.  While the court refers to the compensatory award as “$500 million,” the 
award was actually $507.5 million. Id. at 2634. 
 189. See Posting of Tracy Thomas to Akron Law Café, supra note 180.  (“[I]t is questionable 
whether compensatory damages of only $15,000 per plaintiff are a large amount for someone who 
has lost a year or more of his or her economic livelihood.”).  Professor Thomas also pointed out the 
fact that the $500 million award was equal to approximately four days of Exxon profits.  Id. It is 
also worth noting that the original punitive award of $5 billion was “about one year’s net profits for 
the entire world-wide operations of Exxon, and the jury may well have decided that for such 
egregious conduct the company responsible ought to have a year without profit.” In re Exxon 
Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 2001).  In oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Plaintiffs’ counsel also stressed the amount of the award received by the individual plaintiffs: 
One of the many ways in which this case is the mirror image of the due process cases 
that Justice Souter was referring to that caused this Court to have such great concern 
about the uptick in punitive damages, here you have a single case. You have a single 
digit ratio which is proportionate to the harm that was shown in this case. 
You have -- in contrast to State Farm, in the most recent -- second most recent case this 
case had -- in State Farm you had two plaintiffs who stood before this Court having 
received $500,000 each in compensatory damages for the emotional distress of 18 
months of not knowing whether an insurance claim was going to be paid. What you have 
today are 32,000 plaintiffs standing before this Court, each of whom have received only 
$15,000 for having their lives and livelihood destroyed and haven’t received a dime of 
emotional distress damages. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219), 2008 WL 
534746 at *77. 
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Congress.190  Both Justices also cited the Haslip case and expressed 
doubts that this case really warranted a break from the traditional 
common-law approach.191  Additionally, Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
and dissent pointed to the fact that an “absolute” ratio was not necessary 
in light of the Court’s decision in State Farm, in which the Court 
acknowledged that there would be exceptions to the rule in stating that 
“few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process.”192  This leads one to ask if the Exxon Court would recognize 
any exceptions to its one-to-one ratio. 
In placing so much emphasis on the need for predictability, the 
majority neglected to give proper weight to the other traditional aims of 
punitive damages, namely those of deterrence, revenge, and 
punishment.193  With the Exxon ruling, the Court made it much easier for 
corporate defendants to calculate the likely amount of potential punitive 
damages,194 making punitive damage awards utterly predictable.195  As a 
result, many corporate defendants196 may no longer be deterred from 
acting wrongly out of fear that they could potentially face very 
significant punitive damage awards. 
In their appellate brief, counsel for the plaintiffs addressed this 
traditional purpose of punitive damages by quoting Haslip: “[i]mposing 
 
 190. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2638 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 191. Id. at 2638 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 192. Id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)).  Reliance on this State Farm quote led 
Plaintiffs’ Counsel to argue: “[n]o court in over 200 years of American jurisprudence has adopted 
such a [1-to-1 ratio] common-law rule. Indeed, the only authority Exxon cites for its proposed rule 
is one sentence of dictum in State Farm.” Brief for Respondents at 60, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 
S.Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219), 2008 WL 194284, at *60.   
 193. The court also fails to see the importance of fulfilling the compensatory purpose of 
punitive damages in this maritime case.  See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2637 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out that punitive damages may supplement 
compensation in maritime cases).   
 194. Remember, under State Farm, the ratio could be anywhere from one-to-one to as high as 
nine-to-one. 538 U.S. at 425.   
 195. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 17, at n.177 (setting forth the argument that predictability 
detracts from the ability of punitive damages to deter, using the infamous Ford Pinto case, 
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (1981) as an example).   
 196. Exxon Mobil Corp. broke the United States record for annual profits in 2008.  Porretto, 
John, Exxon Mobil Shatters US Record for Annual Profit, ABC News, Jan. 30, 2009,  
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/IndustryInfo/WireStory? id=6768098&page=1.  The company 
posted $45.2 billion in profits.  Id.  
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exemplary damages on [a] corporation when its agent commits [a tort] 
creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those in a position ‘to guard 
substantially against the evil to be prevented.’”197  While the Court 
argued strenuously for the need for predictability in punitive awards, it 
lost sight of one of the most important purposes of punitive damages: 
punishing wrongdoing defendants.198 
B.  Comparison to BMW and State Farm 
In concluding that the Exxon decision was incorrect, it is helpful to 
look back to BMW and State Farm to ascertain why the Supreme Court 
departed from its prior holdings and decided on the one-to-one ratio.199  
There are several similarities between the wrongdoing in all three of 
these cases, starting with the fact that they all involved corporate 
defendants.200  The nature of the wrongdoing in BMW and State Farm 
involved corporate “policies” that led to increased profits for both 
companies.201 However, Exxon (arguably) involved merely reckless 
conduct202 and did not directly lead to any increased profits for Exxon 
Shipping Co.203  Despite this fact, the wrongful act in Exxon, leading to 
 
 197. Brief for Respondents at 1, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219), 2008 WL 
194284, at *1 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14 (1991) (quoting Louis 
Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927)). 
 198. While Exxon may have merely acted recklessly, the company, along with Captain 
Hazelwood, did, in fact, act wrongfully, and their wrongful conduct resulted in the “worst oil spill in 
history,” causing severe and devastating damage to the Prince William Sound and those who 
depended on the Sound for their livelihood.  Posting of Tracy Thomas to Akron Law Café, supra 
note 180.  Furthermore, as Plaintiffs’ Counsel argued, “[a] jury must have the ability to provide 
punishment commensurate with the defendant’s wantonness and adequate to deter others from 
similar conduct in the future.” Brief for Respondents at 69, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605 
(No. 07-219), 2008 WL 194284, at *69.   
 199. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008).   
 200. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing BMW) and Part II.C.2 (discussing State Farm).   
 201. See supra Part II.C.1 (describing BMW’s policy of repairing damaged cars and selling 
them as new) and supra note 69 (explaining State Farm’s unlawful profit scheme).   
 202. See Fisher, supra note 17, at 42 (“[J]ust as in criminal law, one can imagine various kinds 
of aggravating or mitigating factors that could apply across categories of tortious conduct. A 
defendant’s behavior might involve special levels of malice, it might cause severe collateral harm, 
or it might be less in need of deterrence because of other kinds of punishment already imposed.”). 
 203. The Exxon opinion does mention the fact that “the jury heard evidence that Exxon may 
have felt constrained not to give Hazelwood a shoreside assignment because of a concern that such 
a course might open it to liabilities in personnel litigation the employee might initiate.” Exxon 
Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2632 n.22.  This argument does not appear to be as strong as those that 
were made in both BMW and State Farm, and is significantly weaker than that of Mathias v. Accor 
Economy Lodging, Inc., where defendants were able to charge patrons for staying in rooms that 
were known to be infested with bed bugs. 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003). 
31
Klutinoty: Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
FINAL KLUTINOTY_MACRO.DOC 1/25/2010  2:53 PM 
234 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:203 
the horrific oil spill into the Prince William Sound, likely had further 
reaching deleterious effects204 than the selling of previously damaged 
vehicles as new by BMW,205 and was likely on par with the wrongful 
profit scheme utilized by State Farm.206  As a result, it seems inherently 
unfair that the Court imposed a one-to-one ratio in Exxon while allowing 
higher punitive damage awards to stand in these other cases. 
Additionally, while the original punitive damage award in Exxon 
was $5 billion, this award only represented a ratio of punitive-to-
compensatory damages of approximately ten-to-one, while the ratio in 
BMW was $4 million-to-$4000, a 1000-to-one ratio.207  The 32,000 
members of the plaintiff class in Exxon would have split the $5 billion 
award.208  No one person would have received a windfall as a result of 
the seemingly huge award.  In light of this fact, it seems that even if the 
Court was justified in imposing a one-to-one ratio, a class action arising 
out of such a severe environmental tragedy was not the case in which to 
do so. 
C.  Concerns for the Future -- What Changes will the Exxon Decision 
Bring? 
“Although Exxon is a maritime law case, it is clear that the Supreme 
Court intends that its holding have a much broader application.”209 
 
 204. “Wind and water spread the oil across 600 linear miles (roughly the distance from Cape 
Cod, Massachusetts, to Cape Lookout, North Carolina) and over 10,000 square miles of the 
surrounding marine ecosystem.”  Brief for Respondents at 9, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605 
(No. 07-219), 2008 WL 194284, at *9.  The “oil damaged approximately 1,300 miles of shoreline, 
much of it privately owned. It destroyed the subsistence activities of Native Alaskans . . . .” Brief 
for Respondents at 11, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219), 2008 WL 194284, at *11.  
Additionally, “[t]hough spilling the oil is an accident, putting the relapsed alcoholic in charge of the 
tanker is a deliberate act. The massive disruption of lives is entirely predictable when a giant oil 
tanker goes astray. Thus, Exxon’s reprehen[]sibility goes considerably beyond the mere careless 
imposition of economic harm.”  Brief for Respondents at 59, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. 2605 
(No. 07-219), 2008 WL 194284, at *59.  
 205. See supra Part II.C.1 (describing BMW’s policy of repairing damaged cars and selling 
them as new). 
 206. See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trust Counsel, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Recovery/ 
status.cfm (listing species that have not yet recovered from the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill).  
 207. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 564 (1996).  In BMW, there was an 
explanation for the disparity between the punitive and compensatory damages awards: “[u]sing the 
actual damage estimate of $4,000 per vehicle, Dr. Gore argued that a punitive award of $4 million 
would provide an appropriate penalty for selling approximately 1,000 cars for more than they were 
worth.” Id.  
 208. See supra note 189.  
 209. Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F.Supp.2d 429 (W.D. Pa. 2008). 
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The Exxon Court’s imposition of a one-to-one ratio leads to 
questions as to how lower courts will interpret this decision,210 and how 
far-reaching its applicability will be.211  In analyzing the Exxon decision, 
Professor Tracy Thomas of the University of Akron School of Law 
stated that “[t]he Court’s 1:1 standard, while technically limited to cases 
involv[ing] the sea, creates a precedent for other federal and state cases 
suggesting that punitive damages should not exceed compensatory 
damages.  This is a significant departure from the Court’s prior 
decisions.”212  Thus, despite the fact that the Exxon decision arose out of 
maritime law, the holding may be applicable to other types of actions, 
and courts may, in fact, look to this case before imposing punitive 
 
 210. At least one court has seemingly interpreted the Exxon Shipping decision to be completely 
limited to the maritime context.  See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miell, 569 F.Supp.2d 841, 859 
(N.D.Iowa 2008) (“In determining federal maritime common law, the [Exxon] Court concluded that 
punitive damages should not exceed the compensatory damages awarded. The Court made it clear, 
however, that its inquiry involved ‘reviewing a jury award for conformity with maritime law, rather 
than the outer limit allowed by due process.’ Id. at 2626. That is, the Court did not conclude that the 
Constitution prohibits a punitive damage award greater than the amount awarded for compensatory 
damages, and cited with approval its prior holdings in Gore and State Farm. Id.” (emphasis added)) 
 211. See Brandon T. Morris, Comment, Oil, Money, and the Environment: Punitive Damages 
Under Due Process, Preemption, and Maritime Law in the Wake of the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 33 
TUL. MAR. L.J. 165, 197-98 (2008) (“The Supreme Court’s new cap on maritime law punitive 
damages awards creates some ambiguity as to its application both under maritime law and under 
federal law. . .Whether or not the case applies broadly in maritime law, it could have persuasive 
effect outside of maritime law.”).  Exxon citations appear in a wide variety of motions and briefs 
outside of the maritime context.  See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. 
Flax, 129 S. Ct. 2433 (2009) (No. 08-1010), 2009 WL 1030510 (state products liability action) and 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kelly v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 129 S.Ct. 144(2008) (No. 
07-1452), 2008 WL 2794266 (wrongful termination action) (“In Exxon Shipping Company, this 
Court recently indicated that a one-to-one ratio between punitive damages and compensatory 
damages was appropriate. 2008 WL 2511219 at *21-22. Respondent believes that a one-to-one ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages would also be proper in this case.”). 
 212. Posting of Tracy Thomas to Akron Law Café, supra note 180. 
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damage awards in general tort actions213 or, at the very least, in actions 
arising out of federal common law.214 
Because the Exxon holding and reasoning could potentially be 
applied to other kinds of cases, it is difficult to predict what kind of 
long-term effect this case will have.  In spite of its less-than-universal 
applicability, however, it is likely that any future case that speaks of 
ratios will make mention of the Exxon decision, as was the case after the 
BMW decision.215  If this is true, it is possible that courts may begin to 
impose one-to-one ratios in different types of cases, and, as a result, the 
Exxon decision could completely destroy the foundations on which 
punitive damages are based—their ability to deter. 
Justice Ginsburg raised another question in her dissenting opinion, 
namely whether, “[o]n next opportunity will the Court rule, definitively, 
that 1:1 is the ceiling due process requires in all of the States, and for all 
federal claims?”216  While Justice Ginsburg reaches no definite 
conclusion as to this question, such a blanket ruling would even further 
erode the now tenuous position of punitive damages.217 While the 
Supreme Court has not issued such a ruling as of this date, the United 
States Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided a bad faith 
 
 213. See, e.g., Wendy Rose Parcells, Note, A Monumental Decision or Just an Environmental 
Catastrophe? An In-Depth Look at the Ramifications and Shortcomings of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 16 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 28 (2008)  (“[T]he Supreme 
Court’s refusal to address the confusion around the constitutionality of large punitive damages 
awards under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses left open the question as to 
the size of the ratio of punitive damages awarded to compensatory damages awarded in other tort 
cases.”).  See also Joshua R. Schwartz, Did the Supreme Court Finally Rein in Punitive Damages?, 
8 NO. 5 Ins. Coverage L. Bull. 1, 5 (2009) (“Insurers should encourage policyholders to hold firm 
against the plaintiff’s bar’s threats of excessive punitive damages jury verdicts by pointing to the 
Baker decision and the recent trend of decreased outlier jury verdicts.  We anticipate that litigants in 
state courts will use the Baker decision as relevant, persuasive authority to argue for greater controls 
on punitive damages, although only time will tell if punitive damages have truly been reined in.”). 
 214. See Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 83, at 62 (“Although the holding in Exxon Shipping 
applies only in the narrow context of punitive damages in maritime cases, Souter’s reasoning was 
less about maritime law and more about the need for predictable and consistent rules for punitive 
damages awards. It’s possible, then, that the ruling could apply in suits against federal officers for 
money damages when the cause of action is inferred directly from the Constitution, but it should be 
emphasized that this is a limited category of cases.”). 
 215. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 42, at 943-46.  
 216. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 217. See also Duffy, Shannon, 3rd Circuit Slashes Punitives, Imposes 1-1 Ratio, Law.com, 
Dec. 30, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202427084541 (quoting Plaintiffs’ counsel, 
Mark W. Tanner, who, in an interview following the rendering of the Jurimko decision, commented 
“[w]hat we’re seeing here is a steady erosion of the deterrent effect that punitive damages can play 
in our society”).  The author of this Note strongly agrees with this statement.  See supra Part IV.C. 
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insurance case utilizing the Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker framework, 
Jurinko v. Medical Protective Co.218 
In Jurinko, which was decided on December 24, 2008, the Third 
Circuit Court faced a bad faith lawsuit brought by Mr. and Mrs. Jurinko 
against Medical Protective arising out of a medical malpractice action.219  
After Plaintiffs received a $2.5 million jury verdict in their medical 
malpractice case, one of the original defendants, Dr. Marcincin, assigned 
his right to initiate a bad faith action against Medical Protective to the 
plaintiffs.220  The bad faith case went to trial, and the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $1,658,345 in 
compensatory damages and $6,250,000 in punitive damages.221  This 
verdict represented a ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages of 
almost 3.8-to-1.222  
 
 218. 305 Fed. Appx. 13 (2008). 
 219. Id. at 15-17.  The fact pattern is essentially as follows:  Plaintiff, Jurinko, went to his 
dermatologist in 1992 and again  in 1993 as a result of a growth on his nose.  Id. at 15.  During the 
1993 visit, Plaintiff’s dermatologist, Dr. Marcincin, took a biopsy of the growth and sent it to the 
SmithKline Beecham Laboratory to be analyzed.  Id.  The sample was analyzed by SmithKline 
pathologist Dr. Edelman, who found no cancer cells in the sample but deemed the results to be 
inconclusive with regard to whether or not the Plaintiff had cancer.  Id.  Despite this, Dr. Marcincin 
did not order another biopsy, and in 1999, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Marcincin when the spot 
returned.  Id.  In 2000, Plaintiff was diagnosed with a lymphatic malignant tumor after discovering a 
lump on his neck.  Id.  The 1993 sample that Dr. Marcincin had sent to SmithKline was re-analyzed, 
and pathologists found the sample to be cancerous.  Id. After his diagnosis, Jurinko and his wife 
filed suit against Dr. Marcincin, Dr. Edelman, and SmithKline. Id.  Dr. Edelman and Dr. Marcincin 
both had primary malpractice insurance through Medical Protective Insurance, and they both had 
“statutory excess coverage through the CAT/MCARE Fund.” Id.  Medical Protective appointed one 
attorney to represent both doctors, thereby creating a conflict of interest, and the parties were 
ultimately unable to reach a settlement agreement, despite numerous settlement demands of 
Plaintiff.  Id. at 15-16.  The case went to trial in 2002, and Medical Protective persisted in its 
unwillingness to settle on behalf of Dr. Marcincin.  Id. at 16.  As a result of the failure to settle and 
because the CAT/MCARE Fund was Dr. Marcincin’s excess insurer, the Fund was unable to tender 
payment until Medical Protective paid its policy limits to the Plaintiff.  Id. The jury ultimately 
rendered a verdict against Dr. Marcincin and in favor of the Plaintiffs in the amount of $2.5 million.  
Id. at 17.  This excess verdict was $1.3 million above and beyond the insurance coverage available 
to Dr. Marcincin under both policies.  Id.  
 220. Id. at 17. (“[T]he Jurinkos brought suit in federal court, alleging Medical Protective acted 
in bad faith by appointing Kilcoyne to represent both physicians and by failing to settle the case 
within policy limits.”). 
 221. Id. at 19. 
 222. The Third Circuit eventually placed the ratio at 3.13 to one, as it included the plaintiffs’ 
award of attorney’s fees as compensatory damages.  Id. at 27 n.16.  
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Medical Protective appealed the judgment,223 and the bad faith case 
eventually reached the Third Circuit Court in 2008.224  On appeal, 
Medical Protective argued that the facts of this case did not warrant 
punitive damages.225  The Third Circuit Court rejected that argument, 
and concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
“outrageousness” in the bad faith case.226  In ruling on the 
constitutionality of the punitive damage award, the Third Circuit Court 
applied the same State Farm reasoning that Exxon relied upon,227 and 
imposed a one-to-one ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages, 
resulting in a reduced punitive damage award of $1,996,950.56.228 
There are several aspects of the Jurinko decision that are especially 
noteworthy and unique.  First and foremost is the fact that, unlike Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, Jurinko was not a maritime action, nor was it an 
action arising under the federal common law.229  Instead, this was an 
ordinary, bad faith lawsuit governed by state law.230  Despite this, the 
Third Circuit Court in Jurinko decided to apply the holding of Exxon, 
and imposed the one-to-one ratio of punitive-to-compensatory 
damages.231   
Another reason why this case is so interesting is because of the fact 
that it bears a striking resemblance to State Farm Mutual Automobile 
 
 223. Id.  The District Court denied Medical Protection’s numerous motions, and found that 
“the jury was properly instructed on punitive damages and properly awarded punitive damages, and 
that the award, with a ratio of less than 4:1, was not unconstitutionally excessive.” Id. at 19. 
 224. Id. at 19.  
 225. Id. at 24. 
 226. Id. (quoting Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 883 A.2d 439, 445 (Pa. 2005)) (“Punitive 
damages may be awarded in Pennsylvania ‘when the plaintiff has established that the defendant has 
acted in an outrageous fashion due to either the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference 
to the rights of others.’”). 
 227. Id. at 30 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 425) (“With regard to the 
proper ratio, the Supreme Court has instructed that ‘[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, 
then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of 
the due process guarantee.’”).  This argument is along the same lines as that of Justice Breyer’s 
concurring and dissenting opinion in Exxon. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct 2605, (2008).  
See Part IV.A (quoting State Farm: “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”). 
 228. 305 Fed. Appx. at 32.  The Third Circuit Court also looked to State Farm and BMW in 
reaching its decision.  Id. at 25.   
 229. See supra Part II.E (discussing the maritime context in which the Exxon case arose, as 
well as the federal common law).   
 230. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  
 231. 305 Fed. Appx. at 32.  
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Ins. Co. v. Campbell.232  Both Jurinko and State Farm involved bad 
faith lawsuits brought by insured individuals who were the victims of 
excess verdicts, and both insured assigned their rights to the original 
plaintiffs, Ospital’s estate and Slusher in the State Farm case, and Mr. 
and Mrs. Jurinko in this case.233  Despite these similarities, the Third 
Circuit Court seems to have focused less on the actual single-digit-ratio 
holding of State Farm,234 and more on the Exxon Court’s assertion that 
“when compensatory damages are substantial, ‘the constitutional outer 
limit may well be 1:1.’”235 Consequently, the Third Circuit Court 
imposed a one-to-one ratio.236   
The Jurinko decision is surprising given the fact that Medical 
Protective arguably acted more culpably237 than State Farm, as State 
Farm eventually paid the excess judgment that the jury entered against 
the Campbells.238  As a result of this, the Jurinko decision could 
potentially open the door to the application of the Exxon holding in cases 
involving more than reckless conduct, and even conduct that is 
 
 232. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).  See also supra Part II.C.2.  Like Jurinko, State Farm also involved a 
bad faith action brought against an insurance carrier who refused to settle a civil action for the 
applicable policy limits.  See supra Part II.C.2.  Additionally, in the bad faith trial in Jurinko, 
Medical Protective’s claims adjuster testified that he did not do everything he could do to protect 
Dr. Marcincin, Medical Protective’s insured. 305 Fed. Appx. at 18, n.5. See also Id. at 23 (“All the 
parties, including Medical Protective, knew the case was worth far more than $200,000, but Medical 
Protective refused to negotiate in good faith, instead engaging in admittedly unfair negotiation 
tactics.”).  
 233. State Farm, 538 U.S. 408, 413-414 (2003).  See also supra Part II.C.2 and 305 Fed. Appx. 
13, 17 (2008). 
 234. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008).  (“[A] single digit maximum 
is appropriate in all but the most exceptional of cases.”). 
 235. Jurinko, 305 Fed. Appx. at 27 n.15 (citing Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2634 n.28).  
In Jurinko, the Third Circuit Court concluded that the compensatory damage award was, in fact, 
substantial.  Id. at 28 (“Here the compensatory damages are substantial, Dr. Marcincin suffered only 
economic harm, and the harm was easily measured-it was the amount of the excess judgment.”).  
The Third Circuit Court went on to point out that “[o]ther courts have used a 1:1 ratio as a 
benchmark where compensatory damages are substantial,” and cited various cases, including 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ’g, 507 F.3d 470, 490 (6th Cir. 2007) (setting the 
punitive to compensatory damage ratio at 1:1 or 2:1 where compensatory damages are “substantial”) 
and Williams v. Conagra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 796-99 (8th Cir. 2004) (reducing a punitive 
damage award based on a 1:1 ratio in light of a “substantial” compensatory award).  Jurinko, 305 
Fed. Appx. at 28. 
 236. Jurinko, 305 Fed. Appx. at 30.  See also Rebecca Porter, Third Circuit Establishes One-to-
One Ratio for Punitive Damages, 45-MAR JTLATRIAL 20 (2009). 
 237. Jurinko, 305 Fed. Appx. at 27 (“The harm Dr. Marcincin suffered was the result of 
Medical Protective’s intentional conduct, not accident.”). 
 238. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 414 (2003).  See supra note 67.  
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intentional.239  Furthermore, the Exxon Court’s failure to provide an 
adequate explanation as to why the decision should be limited to 
maritime law will likely contribute to uncertain and uneven application 
of the one-to-one ratio among lower courts.   
D.   Proposed Solution 
While state and federal courts may certainly look to Exxon 
Shipping v. Baker for guidance in reviewing punitive damage awards, it 
would be unwise to extend the Exxon ruling beyond the maritime 
context.  In making its ultimate decision in Exxon, the United States 
Supreme Court based its ruling on a multitude of factors, including the 
fact that Exxon’s wrongful conduct was reckless rather than 
intentional,240 and also on the fact that the harm in this case was purely 
economic.241  Consequently, the Exxon ruling would not support the 
automatic imposition of a one-to-one ratio of punitive-to-compensatory 
damages in a case where the defendant acted intentionally as opposed to 
recklessly, or, arguably, where the harm done was more than purely 
economic.242 
As the dissenting opinions point out, there are serious, unsettling 
issues with the Court’s decision regarding punitive damages.  Such 
issues include whether the Court should have left this matter to Congress 
 
 239. See supra note 237.  It should also be noted that on March 12, 2009, the Sixth Circuit 
imposed a one-to-one ratio of compensatory to punitive damages in an age discrimination case.  
Morgan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 559 F.3d 425 (6th Cir. 2009).  Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit 
did not cite Exxon Shipping in its decision, but instead relied on State Farm to achieve this result.  
See id. at 441. 
 240. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2622 (2008).  The Exxon Court 
differentiated between different types of wrongful conduct, and stated: “[u]nder the umbrellas of 
punishment and its aim of deterrence, degrees of relative blameworthiness are apparent. Reckless 
conduct is not intentional or malicious, nor is it necessarily callous toward the risk of harming 
others, as opposed to unheedful of it.” Id.  The Court looked to the Restatement of Torts, and 
distinguishes the recklessness of Hazelwood and Exxon from actions taken in order to make a 
profit, and concluded that “[a]ction taken or omitted in order to augment profit represents an 
enhanced degree of punishable culpability, as of course does willful or malicious action, taken with 
a purpose to injure.”  Id.  Because the defendants’ actions here were not done with the purpose of 
making a profit, the defendants were less culpable.  See id.  
 241. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2630 n.21. 
 242. See supra note 240.  Such an automatic imposition of a one-to-one ratio may also be 
improper under Exxon in cases involving “action taken or omitted in order to augment profit.”  See 
Exxon Shipping Co, 128 S.Ct. at 2622. 
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to decide,243 and the question of exactly where the Supreme Court will 
draw the line with regards to this one-to-one ratio.244   
While the Court certainly had valid reasons for stressing the need 
for some predictability in punitive damage awards, such as the need for 
fairness245 and the danger unpredictable awards pose for settlement 
negotiations,246 the State Farm decision is able to achieve these 
objectives without obliterating the ability to deter.  Under State Farm, 
defendants can, in fact, predict the approximate range in which their 
punitive damage penalty will fall, based on the likely compensatory 
award.247  This comports with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Mathias 
v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., where the court declared: “[t]he 
judicial function is to police a range, not a point.”248   
Additionally, while punitive damage awards under the State Farm 
standard are admittedly less predictable than under Exxon, one must 
recognize the fact that true predictability will likely never be achieved, 
as it is all but impossible to predict the exact amount of compensatory 
damages that a judge or jury will award in any case or the exact amount 
of harm a wrongful action will cause.249  For all of these reasons, the 
 
 243. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2634-38 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) and Id. at 2639-40 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  See 
also supra Parts III.E and F (detailing Justices Stevens’ and Ginsburg’s concurring and dissenting 
opinions).   
 244. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  See also supra Part III.F (detailing Justice Ginsburg’s concurring and dissenting opinion).   
 245. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2610. 
 246. See id. at 2625 n.15 (“One might posit that ill effects of punitive damages are clearest not 
in actual awards but in the shadow that the punitive regime casts on settlement negotiations and 
other litigation decisions.”).  But see also id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (pointing out that the majority admitted that the traditional maritime approach has not 
“endangered settlement negotiations”).  
 247. See id. at 2634 (majority opinion). (“[A] single digit maximum is appropriate in all but the 
most exceptional of cases.”). 
 248. 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).   
 249. Shanin Specter & Charles L. Becker, The Exxon Decision: Another Bad Call On Punitive 
Damages, 238 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 99 (Nov. 18, 2008).  Specter and Becker concluded that by 
focusing so much on achieving predictability for punitive damages, “the Court failed to recognize 
that one part of the equation – compensatory damages – are inherently unpredictable, as they 
depend on the harm suffered by the plaintiff.” Id.  Specter and Becker go on to conclude that “the 
ratio is inherently unpredictable because it depends on compensatory damages, which in turn 
depend on the harm suffered.” Id.  They go on to conclude that “[a]s bad as the spill was, it could 
have been far worse, and Exxon’s compensatory damages could have been far greater.  Exxon 
should not benefit twice from the ‘lucky break’ that compensatory damages were $507.5 million, 
not a multiple of that number.”  Id.  Specter and Becker also pointed to Flax v. DaimlerChrysler, a 
case in which the Tennessee Supreme Court restored a $15 million punitive damage award where 
compensatory damages were only $5 million, a 3-to-1 ratio. Id. (citing 272 S.W.3d 521) (Tenn. 
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standard of State Farm is preferable to that of Exxon, as it gives courts 
the ability to impose larger punitive damage awards in more extreme 
cases, in cases where the acts of the defendant warrant punishment and 
retribution and give rise to the need to deter, in cases like Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the Exxon Court’s arguably valid reasoning for abandoning 
the State Farm single-digit framework, the one-to-one ratio “solution” is 
simply inadequate and unfairly limiting.  By declaring that a strict one-
to-one maximum ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damage awards shall 
be used in maritime cases, the very purpose of punitive damages, the all 
important goal of deterrence,250 has been eviscerated and rendered 
completely meaningless and void.  This problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that a wide variety of courts have been looking to Exxon for 
guidance in a wide variety of non-maritime cases.251 After Exxon, no 
 
2008).  Specter and Becker assert that DaimlerChrysler is currently seeking Supreme Court review 
of this decision with regards to the punitive award and in light of the Exxon decision. Id. 
 250. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 517, 521-22.   
 251. See, e.g., Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F.Supp.2d 429 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (“Although 
Exxon is a maritime law case, it is clear that the Supreme Court intends that its holding have a much 
broader application.”) and Bridgeport Harbor Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 2008 WL 4926925 (Conn. 
Super.) (“Although the plaintiff is unquestionably correct that Exxon Shipping is not controlling, the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court’s decision is very persuasive in identifying certain factors relevant 
to determining the amount of a punitive damages award, even in a [Connecticut Unfair Trade 
Practices Act] case.”).  At the very least, the Exxon decision is likely to be an available sword for 
defendants facing large punitive damage awards.  See also Joshua R. Schwarts, Did the  Supreme 
Court Finally Rein in Punitive Damages?, Insurance Coverage Law Bulletin, 8 NO. 5 Ins. Coverage 
L. Bull. 1 (June 2009) (“While the Baker decision is factually binding only in federal maritime 
cases and perhaps under federal common law, state courts should find the Baker decision persuasive 
and, in the absence of statutory guidance, will likely apply a similar rationale to state court cases.”).  
Additionally, Professor Fisher noted: 
Just three months after Exxon was handed down, the American Tort Reform Association 
and the Chamber of Commerce filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme Court, asking 
the Court explicitly to hold that the Constitution imposes a one-to-one ratio in cases 
involving “very large compensatory damages and questionable reprehensibility.” Brief 
for American Tort Reform Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, 
NiSource, Inc. v. Estate of Garrison G. Tawney, 129 S. Ct. 626 (2008) (No. 08-219), 
2008 WL 4325538. 
Fisher, supra note 17 at n.13.  Fisher cites Jurinko, and acknowledges that “[a]t least one lower 
court already has accepted this argument.”  Id.  In the Exxon opinion, the Supreme Court stated that 
this holding was limited to maritime law, but the Court failed to provide a satisfactory explanation 
as to why this was the case, thereby giving rise to great confusion among lower courts, culminating 
with the Third Circuit’s decision in Jurinko.  See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 
2633 (2008).  As pointed out in Justice Stevens’ opinion supra Part III.E, there is also a compelling 
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longer will the unpredictability of punitive damages deter corporate 
defendants from acting wrongfully; no longer will the possibility of a 
nine-fold punitive award give such defendants pause.  Instead, 
defendants will have the ability to closely estimate potential punitive 
damage awards based on likely compensatory awards, and can thus 
factor in potential punitive damage awards as a cost of doing business. 
Furthermore, the Exxon ruling also militates against another 
traditional goal of punitive damages, that of revenge or retribution.252  
As a result, the United States Supreme Court has shown that it would 
rather protect the economic interests of reckless defendants than those of 
innocent plaintiffs; it would rather provide a shield for a company who 
knowingly allowed an alcoholic to captain a supertanker than 
compensate those Native Alaskans who relied on the Prince William 
Sound for their livelihood and sustenance.253  This very idea turns the 
doctrine of punitive damages on its head.  The doctrine should not be 
eviscerated to protect the wrongful actor, but should instead be carefully 
tailored in an effort to achieve maximum deterrence and to protect the 
innocent victims of malicious and wrongful acts.   
Imposing a strict one-to-one ratio between compensatory and 
punitive damage awards defeats the purposes of punitive damages by 
diluting the potential for deterrence and making these awards both 
predictable and potentially insurable for wrongdoing defendants.254  
Instead of utilizing the one-to-one ratio propounded by Exxon Shipping 
 
argument against utilizing a one-to-one ratio in the maritime context specifically.  See supra note 
166; see also Lynda Edwards, The Cemetery Sea: A Shipwreck, a Mysterious Owner and a 158-
Year-Old Maritime Law, 95 A.B.A. J. 34, 36 (2009) (pointing out the fact that “[t]he U.S. 
Department of Labor has ranked commercial fishing as the deadliest job,” and also noting that 
maritime law governs much of the commercial fishing industry); Number and Rate of Fatal 
Occupational Injuries, By Industry Sector, 2007, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007),  
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0006.pdf (last visited July 8, 2009) (showing fatality rates in 
various industry sectors); Persons Overboard/Sunk Vessels: Fishing Jobs Continue to Take Deadly 
Toll, Issues in Labor Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1998),  http://www.bls.gov/opub/ 
ils/pdf/opbils21.pdf (last visited July 8, 2009) (“Jobs in commercial fishing have consistently ranked 
among the most deadly.”).  These considerations may lead one to question whether the one-to-one 
ratio is even appropriate in the limited, maritime context, or whether there may be a need to give 
maritime courts more flexibility in fashioning remedies to compensate those individuals injured at 
sea.  See supra note 166.   
 252. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 517, 521-22.   
 253. See supra Part III.A (detailing the factual background of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker).  
 254. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 517 (“It would seem 
that insurance against exemplary damages frustrates their purposes and should be considered 
contrary to public policy.  It is doubtful whether a reckless or  malicious defendant will be deterred 
if he knows that his liability insurer will pay all the damages levied against him.”).   
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Co. v. Baker,255 courts should rely on the more flexible due process 
holding of State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell,256 where 
the Supreme Court held that it was constitutional for the ratio of 
compensatory to punitive damages to be as high as nine-to-one.257   
By following the State Farm rule, fairness and justice can be 
achieved without sacrificing the very purposes for which punitive 
damages are paid and without forcing the nation’s courts to abide by a 
rigid ratio.258  The State Farm rule affords respect and discretion to the 
American judicial system, where punitive damages are usually awarded 
by juries and reviewed by the courts.259  Such discretion is proper in this 
field, as the imposition of punitive damages depends on much factual 
analysis.260 
The Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker decision thoroughly dilutes the 
goals of deterrence and revenge by making punitive damage awards too 
predictable for defendants.  The Exxon decision also needlessly 
complicates the long-standing punitive damage analysis.  Because of 
this, state and federal courts that are not faced with maritime cases or 
cases arising under the federal common law should not engage in an 
“Exxon analysis,” but should instead adhere to the Supreme Court’s 
single-digit maximum multiple,261 constitutionally based holding of 
State Farm for guidance in determining punitive awards.  Such courts 
should give little (if any) weight to the Exxon decision which did, after 
all, arise in a purely maritime context and involved an entirely different 
 
 255. 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008).   
 256. 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).  Recall that State Farm was not a maritime case. See id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Under State Farm’s single digit framework, Mr. Jurinko could potentially have recovered 
as much as $14.9 million in punitive damages.  See Jurinko v. Med. Co. 305 Fed. Appx. 13, 19 (3rd  
Cir. 2008).  
 259. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2616, 2623 (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 
499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991)  (“[I]n most American jurisdictions the amount of the punitive award is 
generally determined by a jury in the first instance, and that ‘determination is then reviewed by trial 
and appellate courts to ensure that it is reasonable.’”).  See also supra note 18, citing Goddard v. 
Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 1869 WL 2230, 15 (1869) (“[I]f the courts will only let the verdicts 
of upright and intelligent juries alone, and let the doctrine of exemplary damages have its legitimate 
influence, we predict these great and growing evils will be very much lessened, if not entirely 
cured.”). 
 260. In deciding whether to impose punitive damages, courts consider factors such as the 
defendant’s reckless conduct or his “evil state of mind.”  Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of 
Torts, supra note 9, at 517.   
 261. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 425.  
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analysis than the Court’s previous constitutionally based punitive 
damage decisions.262 
 
 
 262. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2616.  See supra Part II.E.  It should be noted that many 
courts have acknowledged the limitation of the Exxon decision to maritime law.  See, e.g., Pam, 
S.P.A. v. United States, 2009 WL 3030357 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Line v. Ventura, 2009 WL 1425993 
(Ala. May 22, 2009); Valarie v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 2008 WL 4939951, *9 (W.D. Mich Nov. 17, 
2008) (“The limitations to the maritime situation in Exxon lead this court to the conclusion that 
punitive damages in a case such as this once, involving allegations of egregious violations of 
constitutional rights and malicious behavior resulting in prolonged starvation leading to death, are 
not restricted to a ratio of 1:1 with respect to any potential compensatory damages.”); Mendez-
Matos v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 557 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009); JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, 
NA, 539 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2008); Grosch v. Tunica Co., Miss., 2009 WL 161856, at *16 (N.D. 
Miss. Jan. 22, 2009) (“[T]he holding in Exxon was confined to cases arising under federal admiralty 
law and has no application to the case at hand.”); Smith v Xerox Corp., 584 F.Supp.2d 905, 915 
n.18 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (“Exxon Shipping was a maritime common law case, inapplicable here.”); 
Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 2009 WL 1543913 (W. Va. June 4, 2009).  But see Hayduk v. 
City of Johnstown, 580 F.Supp.2d 429 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (“Although Exxon is a maritime law case, it 
is clear that the Supreme Court intends that its holding have a much broader application.”); 
Bridgeport Harbor Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 2008 WL 4926925 (Conn. Super. Oct. 31, 2008) 
(“Although the plaintiff is unquestionably correct that Exxon Shipping is not controlling, the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court’s decision is very persuasive in identifying certain factors relevant 
to determining the amount of a punitive damages award, even in a [Connecticut Unfair Trade 
Practices Act] case.”).   
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